One of the points at which I disgree with my fellow conservatives is on the "point of personhood" of an embryo. While the standard evangelical and Catholic point of view is that the embryo is a person with rights beginning at fertilization, I think we should legally define it at some later point, perhaps around 4-6 weeks into gestation. At that point, the fetus has a heartbeat and brainwaves, and should logically be protected by law.
As I have been reading some of Wm. Gallston’s works, I found an interesting 2004 essay he wrote entitled RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC REASON. One of the things that he discusses is that Jewish tradition doesn’t give the fetus personhood until 40 days. I feel vindicated.
Here’s some relevant passages. In the first, he is paraphrasing Neuhaus on the point that reason can help us elucidate some public values, but not all:
The distinction between good and bad is more than a variable human contrivance, but goods are multiple, heterogeneous, not reducible to a common measure of value, and not definitively rank-ordered. Human reason can rule out certain courses of action or states of affairs as intolerable, indecent, inhumane. But after what is unacceptable has been excluded, reasonable people can and do differ about what to affirm, and there is no neutral authority to resolve these disagreements.
That is to say, reason can not help us rank values definitively, and while it can help us determine what is definitely OUT of bounds, it can not really help us decide what to affirm (e.g. gay marriage).
- The Talmud distinguishes between an embryo prior to the 40th day and those that develop past that point. A number of otherwise binding legal requirements do not apply to a woman who miscarries before the 40th day of pregnancy. Accordingly, serious genetic defects or medical problems that do not endanger the life of the mother may justify abortion during this period.
- According to Rabbi Breitowitz, a pre-implantation embryo should not be entitled to more halachic protection than a pre-40 day implanted embryo, and there are grounds to afford it less. Thus,
"if genetic testing uncovers a defect which would justify abortion of a pre-40 day embryo, destruction of the preembryo may be similarly permitted." Many, though not all, contemporary authorities go farther, permitting the destruction of so-called surplus pre-implantation embryos even when the actual abortion of the same embryo, once implanted, would be forbidden."
Rabbi Moshe Dovid Tendler summarizes the classical Jewish position in the following terms:
"The Judeo-biblical tradition does not grant moral status to an embryo before forty days of gestation. Such an embryo has the same moral status as male and female gametes, and its destruction prior to implantation is of the same moral important as the "wasting of human seed" . . . The proposition that human hood begins at zygote formation, even in vitro, is without basis in [Jewish] biblical moral theology."
Interestingly, he also discusses how Jews address Catholic and Protestant conservatives on this issue:
It might well be thought that this stance is morally risky, because it may lead to a slippery slope at the bottom of which is the taking of human life. The Jewish tradition is sympathetic to this line of argument. Indeed, much of rabbinic law consists in the effort to build a protective outer perimeter (a "fence") around the law of the Torah.
For this reason, says Rabbi Tendler, Orthodox Judaism "respects the effort of the Vatican and fundamentalist Christian faiths to erect fences that will protect the biblical prohibition against abortion. But a fence that prevents the cure of fatal diseases must not be erected, for then the loss is greater than the benefit."
This last sentence does not seem to want to justify embryonic experimentation beyond the 40 days, but chastises conservatives who want to presume the embryo is a person before that, and in doing so, eliminate that route of possible medical benefits based on such a presumption.
Interestingly, in such moral questions, Gallston suggests that neither reason nor revealed truth can decide for us, but perhaps a third method is possible:
To find a public resolution, one might try to appeal to something between reason and revealed theology—namely, our everyday moral experience.
However, this too is subjective, and in the end, does not solve our dilemma.
Alas, this changes the venue of controversy without resolving it. Consider, for example, the outcome of the deliberations of President Bush’s Council on Bioethics. While ten-member majority of the Council favored a moratorium on cloning for biomedical research, a seven-member minority would have permitted such research under suitable regulation. A noted conservative scholar, James Q. Wilson, joined the dissenters. His justification rested on an account of moral experience:
A fertilized cell has some moral worth, but much less than that of an implanted cell, and that has less than that of a fetus, and that less than that of a viable fetus, and that the same as of a newborn infant. My view is that people endow a thing with humanity when it appears, or even begins to appear, human; that is, when it resembles a human creature.
The more an embryo resembles a person, the more claims it exerts on our moral feelings. Now this last argument has no religious or metaphysical meaning, but it accords closely . . .with how people view one another. . . This fact becomes evident when we ask a simple question: Do we assign the same moral blame to harvesting organs from a newborn infant and from a seven-day-old blastocyst? The great majority of people would be more outraged by doing the former than by doing the latter.
This last paragraph is thought provoking, and I think outlines the progressive moral weight of abortion as we move down the gestational timeline. At what point do we protect the child by law?
In the end, Gallston, who all along has really been paraphrasing Neuhaus, merely suggests a couple of principles which I agree with, though they don’t resolve this entirely.
One argument, which I advance with hesitation for discussion, takes as its initial premise the old Jewish principle that "Anything for which there is no reason to forbid is permissible with no need for justification."
The second premise of the argument is that to justify coercive public law across the boundary of diverse faith communities, only what Neuhaus terms public reason counts as a reason to forbid a practice.
In other words, if we want to outlaw abortion, we have to justify it with reason, not with appeals to religious authority. Of course, I have said this same thing many times. While we may be motivated by religious values, our public arguments must appeal to reason.
CONCLUSION
It is interesting that Jewish tradition seems to assign personhood to the fetus at around 40 days. I think that conservative Christians, whose faith is built on Jewish scripture, should well consider this in making their own conclusions about the personhood of the fetus. Additionally, I think that they should admit that, based on reason and our sense of moral rightness, when the fetus has the obvious qualities of a human instead of just a glob of cells, we have a defendable argument in the realm of public reason to limit abortions – I have called this "reasonable abortion limits."
Interesting as that is, the Talmud hardly carries the authority of scripture itself in the christian tradition. I also wonder if we would call a 22 day old fetus a glob of cells if we truly understood what was contained in those cells and how truly remarkable they are…i mean really, Im 31 and for all intensive purposes, still just a glob of cells…its just that my glob is bigger (especially my fat cells).
The difference is, you are a *highly differentiated* bunch of cells, with well developed systems. Up to a certain point, the embryo is merely a blob of undifferentiated or barely differentiated cells. And certainly, no brainwaves to kill, no heartbeat.
So let me ask you – when I worked with human, cancerous skin cells and grew them in the lab, was I experimenting on humans? What about growing organs (groups of well differentiated cells)?
Regarding the authority of the Talmud, of course it doesn't really have any in the Christian tradition, but the Talmud, if I am not mistaken, is centuries of Jewish systematic theology developed around the Old Testament. Our meager time studying it (by comparison), should give us pause to respect the work they have done, even if they did it without the light of Christ.
I am not saying they are authoritative, only that our application of scripture in these areas is in many ways equally speculative, since scripture doesn't make exact dictates on these issues. AND, we use mostly Old Testament passages to define our stand on the value of the fetus, the same OT that the Jews have spent centuries thinking about.
BTW, This site shows pictures of the developing fetus, which doesn't even implant until week 4. And that is when Jewish tradition says we can no longer interfere.
I'd say that's a good cutoff, since by the end of week 4, the fetus has a heartbeat.
The difference is, you are a *highly differentiated* bunch of cells, with well developed systems. Up to a certain point, the embryo is merely a blob of undifferentiated or barely differentiated cells. And certainly, no brainwaves to kill, no heartbeat.
I agree with Seeker on this point. I would argue further though that a person is made of more than just brainwaves and a heartbeat. 4-6 weeks is way too early for personhood in my opinion.
I appreciate your comments concerning differentiated cells and think the debate is healthy…the only thing I think about is…what if you are wrong? If I am wrong it makes sicence look for antoher route for its experimental studies. If you are wrong, then many people are being killed in the name of science.
Here's a few considerations around the "what if you are wrong" question.
a. This will always be a gray area, legislatively speaking, so from a this world perspective, no one will be able to definitively answer the moral question. So from a "this world" perspective, there is no "right" answer. So I think this compromise is consistent with both a regard for life and for the conscience of the individual, though you might argue it leans towards the former.
b. There is a difference between what I endorse as legislation and what I do personally. Though God may hold me responsible for both, I think there is some wiggle room for me to obey what God asks me to do without making it legislation. In fact:
c. I also think this "compromise" is consistent with scripture, esp. Romans 14. IN such a gray area, I can't hold everyone captive to my conscience, and I think that the human qualities of a 6 week fetus are unarguable, while a blastula is definitely in the gray area.
I appreciate your comments concerning differentiated cells and think the debate is healthy…the only thing I think about is…what if you are wrong?
Here is the answer to a more general version of your question…
Richard Dawkins answers the question, "What if you're wrong?"
OUCH!
I would agree there is a bit of gray in the topic being discussed here…my secondary point is simply that the consequences for you being wrong is the legalized death of MANY children (if not the harvesting of them). The consequence of me being wrong is that science must find another route to experiment with finding cures to diseases. Comparing those consequences with this specific topic and what Richard Dawkins is speaking about is apples and oranges…not sure where the ouchie is. As far as liability, I have no idea as to what our level of responsibility is, but there is obviously enough to think through the issue or this blog post would be meaningless.
I'm not sure why anyone finds Dawkins polemics convincing enough to say "ouch" unless non-sequiturs and unsubstantiated claims make you wince.
Now Sam Harris, him I follow, even when I disagree. He's much more articulate and logical, though many of his primary assumptions, analyses of history, and conclusions I disagree with (you can logically progress from assumption to conclusion, but if your assumption is wrong, all that logic is for naught).
I'm not sure why anyone finds Dawkins polemics convincing enough to say "ouch" unless non-sequiturs and unsubstantiated claims make you wince.
That's because you are being a dense. Instead of blowing hot air as usual, point out the "non-sequiters" and "unsubstantiated claims" in the Dawkins clip.
Comparing those consequences with this specific topic and what Richard Dawkins is speaking about is apples and oranges
Granted.
…not sure where the ouchie is.
The ouch is in Dawkins response to the questioner in the video. It does not pertain to you.
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…my secondary point is simply that the consequences for you being wrong is the legalized death of MANY children
Of course, I agree with what you posted. Sorry for not watching the video, but it is blocked by our proxy, and well, I'm used to Dawkins being a blowhard.
What he should also mention in his moral indignation regarding blastocysts is the other side of the coin, the scientists and doctors who have no concern for a 6 week old fetus who is already a highly differentiated. If scientists were really smart about getting people on their side for this research, they would emphasize what safeguards could be in place to prevent research on anything more than a blastocyst.
Seeker, you admit you can't even watch the Dawkins clip yet you still feel free to criticize it. You are speaking from ignorance.
I want to say something about this site. It gives the information relating to the brainwaves and should legally define it at some later point, perhaps around 4-6 weeks into gestation. At that point, the fetus has a heartbeat and brainwaves, and should logically be protected by law.
brainwaves