One of my top three favorite magazines, Wired, has a really good piece on The New Atheism this month. It covers the mouthpieces at the head of this movement (Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett), as well as articles on other notable atheists including Steve Olson, Penn and Teller, and Warren Allen Smith.
What I really like about these new atheists is:
- Their open hostility to religion. They take their total faith in reason to its logical end – that of being opposed to all religion. They don’t hide their disdain for faith, but are compelled to evangelize for atheism and against religion, and to utilize government to prevent people from indoctrinating their children. Their extreme honesty shows their extreme prejudice in these matters.
"But the atheist movement, [ ] has no choice but to aggressively spread the good news. Evangelism is a moral imperative. Dawkins does not merely disagree with religious myths. He disagrees with tolerating them, with cooperating in their colonization of the brains of innocent tykes. "It’s one thing to say people should be free to believe whatever they like, but should they be free to impose their beliefs on their children? Is there something to be said for society stepping in? What about bringing up children to believe manifest falsehoods?"
- Their rejection of agnosticism and liberal religionists. They clearly find these positions cowardly, illogical, and akin to aiding religionists. In a word, they find these positions hypocritical. I tend to agree with respect to liberal religionists, but I think agnostics are probably honest about their lack of faith, without resorting to the hubris of telling everyone else that faith is foolish.
"Like Dawkins, Slade rejects those who might once have been his allies: agnostics and liberal believers, the type of people who may go to church but who are skeptical of doctrine. "Moderates give a power base to extremists," Slade says."
[…]
Most of these people call themselves agnostic, but they don’t harbor much suspicion that God is real. They tell me they reject atheism not out of piety but out of politeness. As one said, "Atheism is like telling somebody, ‘The very thing you hinge your life on, I totally dismiss.’" This is the type of statement she would never want to make.
This is the statement the New Atheists believe must be made — loudly, clearly and before it’s too late.
- Their rejection of religious pluralism. They reject the idea that we must respect every belief that calls itself a faith, because by this rule, we must accord those like Bin Laden some measure of respect and validity. Of course, their solution, rather than exercising discernment so that we can evaluate the value of a faith tradition against objective measures of such things as the production of liberty, reason, works of mercy, kindness, and justice, to name a few, is to reject all faith. When you are an extremist, life is so simple!
As Dawkins writes in The God Delusion, "As long as we accept the principle that religious faith must be respected simply because it is religious faith, it is hard to withhold respect from the faith of Osama bin Laden and the suicide bombers."
The New Atheist insight is that one might start anywhere — with an intellectual argument, with a visceral rejection of Islamic or Christian fundamentalism, with political disgust — and then, by relentless and logical steps, renounce every supernatural crutch.
Of course, I don’t really LIKE the aims of this atheism, but at least it doesn’t equivocate. However, the atheist approach has many problems.
- It rejects what it cannot prove with logic
- It fails to inspire or give meaning
- It is impractical in that it assumes that people will abandon faith in the light of argument
- It provides no alternate to people’s real need for faith
The author of the article admits his unease with the limits of the new atheism
- Their Arrogance: "Contemptuous of the faith of others, its proponents never doubt their own belief. They are fundamentalists. I hear this protest dozens of times. It comes up in every conversation. Even those who might side with the New Atheists are repelled by their strident tone."
- Their lack of practical solutions: "The New Atheists never propose realistic solutions to the damage religion can cause. For instance, the Catholic Church opposes condom use, which makes it complicit in the spread of AIDS. But among the most powerful voices against this tragic mistake are liberals within the Church — exactly those allies the New Atheists reject. The New Atheists care mainly about correct belief. This makes them hopeless, politically."
- Atheism’s Result – Cruelty?: "Didn’t they try a cult of reason once, in France, at the close of the 18th century, and didn’t it turn out to be too ugly even for Robespierre?"
The article, overall, is informative and engaging, well worth reading.
Seeker,
You are exactly like these Atheists, only a Christian. How can you not see the difference?
You are exactly like these Atheists, only a Christian. How can you not see the difference?
I disagree.
– i do not think that rationalism has no part in public life or politics
– i do not think that humanism is totally bankrupt or has nothing to offer
– i do not want a theocracy
– i provide practical solutions for what ails society
– i am not asking people to abandon logic and reason to accept faith as a valid way of seeing. In fact, I argue that they work together
– i am not advocating a faith only position, or a blind faith position (which is the only kind of faith an atheist recognizes)
I do have some things in common with them, just like I do with Islam. The fact is, most people who have an enduring ideology have SOME things right, and I acknowledge them, rather than demonizing them entirely (well, except for evolutionists, who are entirely brainwashed ;).
So what if they call out the obvious logical inconsistencies and cowardice, and hypocrisy of many middle positions? So what if they are honest about how multiculturalism and uncritical "tolerance" is often logically idiotic?
Again, they, like secularists, deserve credit for where I think they are right in their criticisms of religion and their honesty about what holding a certain position means, even the logical extensions of their positions. I am not a hard-core religionist, and recognize that religious claims of authority, in and of themselves, can not hold sway in public policy.
I wouldn't be surprised if some clear-thinking atheist was honest enough to admit that evolutionary thinking DOES play into and often support Social Darwinism and eugenics.
I am not as extreme as you would like me to be, though you often accuse me.
Speaking of "The New Atheism" I wanted to share this article about one of the men you mentioned in your post, DANIEL C. DENNETT. He almost died recently and was asked by his religious friends if the experience had changed his thinking about God.
THANK GOODNESS!
Evangelicals, you won't believe your eyes!
Richard Dawkins wearing a T-shirt that says "Atheists for Jesus"
Here is the scoop…
I agree with seeker's points, except that I merely substitute "religion" for "atheism." Simple!
HI Cinaste:
The thing is, Dawkins apparently believes the Sermon on the Mount is worthy of respect even though he has no evidence to support this belief (nor is any such evidence possible). Obviously we Christians agree with his assessment of the SoM, but if he were consistent he would not.
your friend
keith
"Dawkins apparently believes the Sermon on the Mount is worthy of respect even though he has no evidence to support this belief (nor is any such evidence possible)."
I assume you are referring to the "Golden Rule" when you refer to the Sermon on the Mount. This is by no means unique to Christianity and moreover, there are mountains of evidence that suggest the "Golden Rule" is good for human society. Like Dawkins, I follow the Golden rule not for religious reasons, but for my own moral reasons based on evidence.
Respectfully,
Cineaste
Life of Brian- Sermon on the Mount Scene
"Obviously we Christians agree with his assessment of the SoM."
By the way, I don't think Seeker agrees. He definitely would not agree with you that Christendom is based on the SoM. He likes to interpret the Biblical Jesus as sort of an aggressive fighting Jesus, not a loving pacifist Jesus. To Seeker, the SoM Jesus is week and should be downplayed in favor of his own "fighting Jesus." I don't think Seeker believes the meek will actually inherit the Earth. Ironically, Seeker is rather Darwinian in this respect.
week = weak
Hi Cineaste:
The Sermon on the Mount is considerably more than the Golden Rule (it's found in Matthew 5-7). Your Dawkin's quote had Dawkins saying his respect for Jesus is based not on the cross but rather on the Mount. But anyway…
You wrote: "I assume you are referring to the "Golden Rule" when you refer to the Sermon on the Mount. This is by no means unique to Christianity and moreover, there are mountains of evidence that suggest the "Golden Rule" is good for human society. Like Dawkins, I follow the Golden rule not for religious reasons, but for my own moral reasons based on evidence"
1. I am not arguing that there's no evidence that the Golden Rule is good for society. I am claiming that there's no evidence that you *ought* to follow the Golden Rule. You might argue that since you are part of society then what's good for society is good for you, but IMO that ignores the possibility that your personal interest might differ from the interests of society. Clearly you are better off if everyone *else* follows the Golden Rule, but this doesn't preclude *you* from gaining advantage by violating the rule from time to time.
2. I have to ask what you mean by "I follow the Golden rule not for religious reasons, but for my own moral reasons based on evidence". I can't see what kind of evidence you could be talking about here. You believe that in most circumstances it would be immoral to steal a first grader's lunch money, but what kind of *evidence* could you marshal in support of this belief? I assume you are saying that your own *personal moral beliefs* prohibit you from stealing lunch money from children, but this is really just saying that you believe it's wrong to do so. How can you have *evidence* for this?
your friend
Keith
"I am claiming that there's no evidence that you *ought* to follow the Golden Rule."
I must say, that's a strange claim. Why do you claim you "ought" to follow the Golden Rule? Fear of divine consequences?
"I have to ask what you mean by "I follow the Golden rule not for religious reasons, but for my own moral reasons based on evidence"."
Morality is hardwired into us which our intellect then mitigates. http://www.reason.com/news/show/35014.html
Hi Cinaste:
Your question to me first: I do not think we ought to follow the Godlen Rule *because* there are divine consequences for not following it; it's the other way around IMO.
I claimed there is no evidence that you *ought* to follow the Golden Rule; you say my claim is odd. I appreciate your response but I have to ask: what is *odd* about the claim? Are you saying it's odd that I can't see the obvious evidence? The fact is I cannot see any such evidence and if you have any I'd appreciate your pointing it out to me even if it should have been obvious to me.
Or maybe you are saying that it's not the kind of thing there *can* be evidence for so my implied request for such evidence is odd. If that's your point, well it's mine too. The Golden Rule makes a claim about how you *ought* to behave and you agree that you ought to behave that way. But this means you believe something without evidence (what with there not being evidence that you *ought* to follow the GR). That's OK of course, if fact if a person's cosncience is working properly she will believe all kinds of things without the existence of evidence (moral claims are a prominent example).
You suggest that the Golden Rule is hardwired into human beings. I'd have to disagree–since people quite frequently fail to follow the Golden Rule it cannot be that following the Golden Rule is part of our hardwiring. Maybe you are saying that we are hardwired to *believe* that we ought to follow the Golden Rule even though we often fail to live up to our standards. But at most that could explain how it is that people come to the belief, it cannot show the belief is true. A sociopath might be hardwired differently which would make his moral opinions different from yours, but it wouldn't make your moral opinions better than his.
your Friend
Keith
Cineaste, how did that link show that morality is hard wired into us? It merely illustrated that different portions of the brain processed different decisions. That doesn't tell us why we act morally or immorally, at the most it just shows that one part of the brain is the first to contemplate the decision.
"I do not think we ought to follow the Golden Rule *because* there are divine consequences for not following it; it's the other way around IMO."
It's like I said "Black is not White" and you reply, "On the contrary, White is not Black." Explain why you "ought" or "ought-not" follow the Golden Rule.
"I appreciate your response but I have to ask: what is *odd* about the claim?"
Because you have no evidence. I do.
"The fact is I cannot see any such evidence and if you have any I'd appreciate your pointing it out to me even if it should have been obvious to me."
Sure: "Chimp Fights and Trolley Rides" http://www.wnyc.org/shows/radiolab/episodes/2006/…
"You suggest that the Golden Rule is hardwired into human beings. I'd have to disagree–since people quite frequently fail to follow the Golden Rule…"
That's where the hardwiring is mitigated by intellect.
"A sociopath might be hardwired differently…"
Or, his hardwiring is not functioning. Hence, the lack of empathy and remorse.
"It merely illustrated that different portions of the brain processed different decisions. That doesn't tell us why we act morally or immorally."
No, look more carefully. There is a conflict. The radio labs program should clear it up.
Cineaste, are you saying you believe by faith that "the radio labs program should clear it up?" ;)
It's my hope Aaron :)
Hi Cineaste:
Taking your points point by point:
1. You ask me why (according to me) we ought to obey the Golden Rule. My answer is: because it's the right thing to do, not because we derive personal benefit from following it. I suspect you'll consider my answer non-responsive:-). I suspect you are asking me what *makes* us obligated to follow the GR. IMO that's a side issue from the one we are discussing, which is namely about whether or not Dawkins (or you or me for that matter) properly believe anything even without there being evidence to support that belief. If you believe we *should* follow the GR, I contend your belief isn't based on evidence. Any evidence you can cite that shows primates *tend* to follow something like the Golden Rule doesn't show that they *ought* to.
2. You suggest that following the Golden Rule is hardwired into us, and you explain the fact that every one of us frequently fails to follow it as our instinct being overruled in those instances by our intellect. It seems to me that this implies our hardwiring permits frequently NOT following the GR (duh:), but actually this whole hardwiring discussion is beside the point. Supposing we are hardwired to *believe* the Golden Rule doesn't imply that we ought to follow that rule. I am hardwired to sneeze when I first go out in the sun, but the fact that I *behave* that way doesn't imply that I *should* behave that way.
The Golden Rule makes a claim about how we *should* behave; there is no necessary connection between that and how we *do in fact* behave. You cited evidence about how primates in fact behave, but that is irrelevant to the question of how they should behave. What evidence do you have about how we *should* behave?
BTW, I don't think the Golden Rule is the best summation of our moral responsibilities. IMO the Sermon on the Mount is a better description and it's requirements are somewhat more stringent than those of the GR.
your Friend
Keith
PS. Just to avoid a possible conflict: my sign off is kind of a joke (unless jokes have to be funny:-). I am a Quaker and Quakers are also called Friends because we try to be Friendly to everyone we come across. I don't mean to presume a familiarity that some might find offensive.
"…we ought to obey the Golden Rule. My answer is: because it's the right thing to do, not because we derive personal benefit from following it."
Well, then we agree. As an atheist, that's why I obey the golden rule.
"IMO that's a side issue from the one we are discussing, which is namely about whether or not Dawkins (or you or me for that matter) properly believe anything even without there being evidence to support that belief."
What's your evidence then?
"I am hardwired to sneeze when I first go out in the sun, but the fact that I *behave* that way doesn't imply that I *should* behave that way."
The sneeze analogy is inaccurate. Why? Because sneezing is not a moral dilemma. I'll run with it though…
If you are having dinner with some people and you felt a sneeze coming on while chewing your food, you would try to stifle your sneeze so as not spew food all over them. Why should (ought) you do this? Because, it's the right thing to do. That's the reason you gave me in #1.
"What evidence do you have about how we *should* behave?"
How we should behave is hardwired by evolution into us. I've already provided you with the radio labs program with brain scan testimony as evidence. If you can't accept it because you are a creationist, please say so.
"BTW, I don't think the Golden Rule is the best summation of our moral responsibilities. IMO the Sermon on the Mount is a better description"
It's just another incarnation of the Golden Rule. "Blessed are the cheese makers. Why the cheese makers? Well, it's not meant to be taken literally, it applies to any manufacturer of a dairy product. Oh! He said the Meek; blessed are the meek!" :)
Cin, I'm an atheist and I don't accept this. It's not evidence, because it's purely circular reasoning.
—
(1) You have a belief about whether X is or is not "moral". You don't want people to do it, and you're looking for some evidence to support your claim that we have a "moral" obligation not to ever do X.
(2) You scan the brains of people as they do X, and as they watch others do X. In these scans, you note very common neuronal activities in almost all your subjects. These activities take place in subjects who, like you, think X is detestable.
(3) Citing these activities, you claim to have found a common "moral grammar" which is "hard-wired", and which supports your claim that X is universally, morally wrong, and that we all have a moral obligation not to do X.
(4) Someone points out that not all people do exhibit this neuronal behavior, when presented with X.
(5) You claim that these people's hard-wiring is damaged, or not functioning, and maintain that everyone, regardless of their feelings about X, regardless of their actual brain activity, is morally obligated not to do it.
—
Do you see how this is not helpful? The presence of similar behavioral patterns, whether genetically-based or not, does nothing to suggest that there is any kind of obligation, on anyone's part, to act on these patterns.
Keith rightly points out that, even in areas where you claim there is a universal morality, many people seem to be quite readily ignoring this. He said:
To which you replied that, in these cases, their moral "hard wiring" has been superceded by their intellect, or is "not functioning" (whatever that is supposed to mean). Whether that's true or not is sort of irrelevant, I think. You are giving this genetic intution a certain amount of special authority, and I don't see how you're justifying that. If other parts of my brain can supercede these intuitions, or if these intuitions can plausibly be missing from birth, or if these intuitions can disappear through experience, then how can you reasonably claim that they are universal, or that they create some sort of obligation on anyone's part?
If I do not experience all the same moral intuitions as you — and it is inarguably true that I do not — then on what basis should I believe that one of our sets of intuition is more "moral" than the other? You can't just point to a brainscan and claim that it proves anything about what everyone universally should do. As David Hume pointed out, you cannot derive an "ought" from an "is".
Let me ask you, what do you mean by obligation? I am arguing that we are partially obliged to our instinct to act "morally." In the case of animals, the less mental faculties they posses the more they are obliged to obey their instinct.
"So you say "Animals have an obligation to defend their young." But then I point out that, actually, most species (reptiles, fish, insects, etc.) don't do this."
I honestly don't see how this is relevant. It would be relevant if I was arguing for some universal morality but I'm not. I continuing to argue for absolute morality as expressed in the Big Question #1 post. According to the definition of absolute (6. viewed independently; not comparative or relative; ultimate; intrinsic: absolute knowledge.), I've seen nothing to counter de Waal's "animal's do have oughts." You characterize his argument as "This happens, therefore it ought to happen." He is not saying that. De Waal is saying moral "oughts" evolve at the gene level from the "is." Here is your example of this…
You go on to say "I don't believe for a moment that vampire bats and humans are sharing access to some sort of universal truth." I agree. They are actually sharing an evolutionary behavior (Altruism and Retribution) that "is" hardwired into their genes that tells them how they "ought" to behave. Why doesn't this demonstrate that "ought" came from "is?" This is different from Hume's argument, "…given our knowledge of the way the world is, how can we know the way the world ought to be?" We can't KNOW how the world "ought" to be but we can have an instinct hard wired into our genes that indicates how we "should/ought" to behave. Just look at your own example!
Where do we disagree?
Well, maybe we don't disagree, but you are using words like "ought" and "obliged", which leads me to believe that we are. Let's explore that further, then.
I try to ensure that all of the words I use adhere to a common usage. In this case I don't believe that an obligation can truly exist. But I mean it as, if someone has an obligation to do something, then they should do it, they ought to do it, that doing it is morally right, and not doing it is morally wrong, that the action is justified, and inaction on the matter is not. All of these phrases essentially refer to the same concept of obligation. If you think that seems somewhat circular, I agree with you, insofar as I think they are all metaphysical and devoid of real meaning. It's the circular nature of their definition that allows people do continue using them uncritically.
I would not say that we are "obliged" to follow our instincts. Instead I would simply say that we often do follow our instincts. And, for various reasons, sometimes we don't. There's no "ought" involved here, nor do I see any reason to wish that there is. I, for one, am perfectly happy to accept the fact that things simply "are". There is no basis, and no real advantage, in declaring how things "ought" to be.
Furthermore, our 'instincts' do not end with moral intuition. We also have an instinct to think about things, and to pursue alternatives, and to reconsider our initial reactions when it suits us to do so. There is no reason to think that the particular set of intutions that Marc Hauser studies are weightier than the countless other intuitions that we feel. For instance, I, like virtually all other people, have an intuition that snakes are dangerous. That doesn't mean that all snakes actually are dangerous. I am mildly afraid of extreme darkness, like almost every other human, but it would be patently meaningless for me to claim that there is something absolutely scary about darkness. My fear, no matter how common, is still entirely subjective.
Not only can we not "know" how the world ought to be, but there simply is no way that the world ought to be. The idea that the world "ought" to be some way is pure metaphysical nonsense. Your stress of the word "KNOW", above, implies that you believe otherwise, that you think there really is some way that the world ought to be, but that we can't "KNOW" what it is. Maybe I'm misunderstanding your point, but the stress seems clear enough.
That we have intutions which are genetically based is not in contention here. I don't see any reason, though, why you believe these intutions should have any evaluatory authority over what we do or don't do in our lives. As I pointed out above, I have a negative intution about darkness and snakes. I also have an intution about not trusting strangers, and about being aggressive to other men my age, and about being posessive regarding my wife's attention. Most of the time, thankfully, I'm able to see these intuitions in the context which they arise, and to mitigate them when it seems appropriate. The same is true for "moral" intutions. They are constantly circumvented, and I see no reason why this should not be so. I can't for the life of me understand what you think is "absolute" about them.
Hi Cineaste
So many good responses, I will try to do justice to them with my responses:-)
1. I definitely expected that was the reason you obey the Golden Rule. I cannot claim to be always so noble though–I often fail to obey the GR. But it seems to me that you have confirmed my claim about atheists *properly* believing some things in spite of the lack of evidence. You ask me what *my* evidence is. I also have none. That's actually my point: atheists like Dawkins are being hypocritical (in the technical sense) when they claim to proportion their belief to the evidence.
2. My point about hardwiring was that a moral instinct being hardwired isn't evidence that following that instinct is the right thing to do–at most it explains how we come to *think* that said morality is the right thing to do. By the way, I am not a creationist. Also by the way; the point I am making has nothing to do with creationism/evolution. Any evidence you have for a moral instinct being the product of evolution is irrelevant to the question of whether we *ought* to follow the evolved morality.
3. The Golden Rule just says we should *act* toward people the way we'd like to be treated; the Sermon on the Mount says we ought to go farther than that. The Sermon on the Mount made a moral equation between killing a person and being angry with that person, even if we *don't* kill the person. I think the point of the Sermon is that it's our inner attitude that determines the answer to the moral question, not the action itself. If a delusional person believed that shooting a person was necessary to save his life, he would be *moral* to shoot the person. If the same deluded soul believed that saving his life would cause him great harm, he would be *immoral* to save the person's life. It's all about the inner attitude. The inner attitude associated with being angry contains the same moral material as does an actual act of violence.
Your Friend
Keith
“But it seems to me that you have confirmed my claim about atheists *properly* believing some things in spite of the lack of evidence.”
Nope. There is evidence for doing the right thing. I’ll say it again, there are mountains of evidence to suggest that the golden rule is good for society. Utilitarianism is one reason I “ought” to follow the golden rule.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism
“My point about hardwiring was that a moral instinct being hardwired isn’t evidence that following that instinct is the right thing to do–at most it explains how we come to *think* that said morality is the right thing to do.”
Well, you are essentially repeating what I said earlier: That’s where the hardwiring is mitigated by intellect.
“Any evidence you have for a moral instinct being the product of evolution is irrelevant to the question of whether we *ought* to follow the evolved morality.”
The “ought” is derived from our moral intuitions hard-wired into us by evolution. This has nothing to do with what I think you are defining “ought” as; metaphysically objective. I define “ought” as epistemologically objective.
This is why “mitigation by reason and intellect” is such an important part of my argument about hardwired moral intuition.
Source:Thinking Critically About the “Subjective”/”Objective” Distinction
As for point #3, honestly Keith, I still don’t see how the SoM is not just another incarnation of the Golden Rule.
P.S. Stewart, the above may address some of your comments as well.
Stewart,
"Your stress of the word "KNOW", above, implies that you believe otherwise, that you think there really is some way that the world ought to be, but that we can't "KNOW" what it is."
We can't know but we can predict. We can infer with the scientific method. :) Check out the "pain" example in the post above.
"I don't see any reason, though, why you believe these intuitions should have any evaluatory authority over what we do or don't do in our lives."
Intuitions have intuitive authority but all the "evaluative authority" upon morality comes from our intellect. This is what the brain scans "Chimp Fights and Trolley Rides" demonstrated right? It demonstrated the conflict between the moral instinct and the moral cognition that is human morality.
"I can't for the life of me understand what you think is "absolute" about them (moral intuitions)."
Because moral intuitions are not relative to circumstances, culture, belief, personal preference, etc. These are the red portions of the brain in the scans.
Absolute – (6. viewed independently; not comparative or relative; ultimate; intrinsic: absolute knowledge.)
The cognitive part of our moral processes are not absolute. They are subject to circumstances, culture, belief, personal preference, etc. These are the blue portions of the brain in the scans.
I made this point in the Big Question #1 post.
This is utter nonsense. There is no ‘way’ in which the world ought to be. There is no state of the universe which is objectively preferrable over another state of the universe. Any state of the universe which you point to as preferrable can only, by definition, be subjectively preferrable, even if it were popularly so. To think otherwise is purely religious. Frankly, I’m disappointed that you believe this, because you are an otherwise rational person.
And what would it mean to predict the way that the world ought to be? You can predict the way the world will be, or you can express how you (subjectively) believe the world should be, but to predict how the world ought to be is a confusing statement. It’s like saying that the way the world ought to be will actually change in the future, so we’ll have to predict what our beliefs about the future will eventually be. And even then, it still requires an admission of subjectivity. Did you mean something else?
If you believe that moral intuitions are exactly the same, all the time, for all people, everywhere, then I have a bridge to sell you. Moreover, you have not really addressed my challege to explain why you give more authority to these particular intuitions than you do to any other intuitions, or to other preferences or considerations. Your only response has been to say that they are “not relative”. Even if this were true — and they are certainly relative to different individuals — it doesn’t give them any moral authority.
In other words, Why should I obey my “moral” intuitions, rather than other intuitions, or rationalizations, or preferences? You haven’t provided any non-arbitrary reason for this yet. You have continually argued that these intuitions are more basic than other neurological factors that would influence my actions, but (1) you haven’t established this as being true, nor do I think you can, and (2) you haven’t given a reason why that piece of information should even be relevant at all.
I can’t follow what your point is, here, unfortunately. Are you saying that “morality” is the combination of intuitive thought and non-intuitive thought? If so, then your view of morality is even more obviously subjective than I previously realized. If the authority of our intutions is only established by our non-intuitive thinking, then it will be (and it clearly is) different for every individual. Again, I fail to see what’s ‘absolute’ about this.
Cineaste, I feel like this isn’t going anywhere, and that you are not answering a number of important challenges to your position. I would like to hear your responses, though.
Stewart, it seems we are talking about apples and oranges. Have you read my posts carefully? I have answered you many times but I think we are on a different wavelength.
I don’t agree with this.
I agree with this completely.
You’re disappointed in me because I think you misunderstood my posts again.
Yes, this is what I mean by “ought” to be. If it starts raining, that rock “ought” to get wet. I don’t KNOW for sure that it “will” but it “ought” to. Did you read the article about objectivity and subjectivity?
http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/subjective_objective.html
“What we’ve just shown is that although moral feelings exist in a metaphysically subjective way, there can still be epistemological objectivity about them. Just as doctors can use epistemologically objective scientific methods to investigate metaphysically subjective matters like pain, so we can use epistemologically objective rational methods to investigate metaphysically subjective matters like moral feelings.”
Well yes, that’s the way nature works. Oughts change according to circumstance.
No, this is what I meant. Yes, it does require an admission of subjectivity and yes, it’s subjective. We use epistemologically objective rational methods to investigate metaphysically subjective matters.
I don’t believe that and I think you know this. But one can certainly make a generalization that someone who is forced to eat rotten eggs with a spoiled milk chaser will have a “gut reaction” of disgust. I.E. I ought not eat rotten eggs and drink spoiled milk. There are exceptions to this like Tom Delay.
It’s impossible to have metaphysical objective moral authority over anyone but you can have epistemological objectivity authority over them. “…once you allow that people can reason about morality, you undermine ethical subjectivism entirely, since as a matter of fact, not all arguments are equivalent, some are better than others, and so some people’s moral claims are objectively more worthy of belief than others — because they are more reasonable.”
“Most philosophers would say ethical statements are NOT mere matters of opinion, because there is wide interpersonal and intercultural agreement about what sort of person is a good person, and what sort of behavior is morally problematic. Certainly there are disagreements about ethical matters, but disagreements tend to be over which of several commonly-accepted moral precepts should be applied to a particular case. For example, people disagree about the morality of abortion, but both sides agree that, other things being equal, it’s wrong to take innocent human life; we should take care of children the best we can; some pregnancies are unusually problematic; we should be compassionate towards women facing difficult choices, etc. The task is to reason our way to consensus, and most philosophers assume we are alike enough and reason similarly enough that some arguments will prove more compelling than others.”
For example, I can say with epistemological objectivity that boiling babies for pleasure is wrong. I can’t say that with metaphysical objectivity.
Yes. And yes, it’s subjective. But, once you allow that people can reason about morality, you undermine ethical subjectivism entirely, since as a matter of fact, not all arguments are equivalent, some are better than others, and so some people’s moral claims are (epistemologically) objectively more worthy of belief than others — because they are more reasonable.
I think when you say “absolute” you actually mean “universal.” This is apples and oranges.
Absolute – 6. viewed independently; not comparative or relative; ultimate; intrinsic: absolute knowledge.)
Universal – 2. applicable everywhere or in all cases; general
According to the dictionary, something does not have to be true of every individual to be absolute. Because moral intuitions are not relative to circumstances, culture, belief, personal preference, etc. they are by definition absolute though not necessarily universal.
I made an effort to address your post sentence by sentence. I’m trying very hard. Everything I have said is supported by the research of John Searle, Marc Hauser and Frans de Waal. Basically, I haven’t bought any bridges yet. :)
I see what you mean about ‘absolute’ and ‘universal’, but I still think it points to the basic problem with your argument. Maybe I’m still not following you, though, so I will try to clarify this. Please pardon the length.
You have agreed that intuitions, moral or otherwise, are not universal. I assume you also agree that beliefs, moral or otherwise, are not universal. If I am incorrect, let me know, but as far as I can tell, we no longer need to discuss this part of the issue.
If morality is not universal, as we have agreed, then I must reject your claim that some moral beliefs are more reasonable than others. People may disagree about whether X is immoral, and this may be due to a difference of moral intuitions between us. In such a case, arguing about whose belief is more reasonable, or more correct, is quite pointless.
Examine the following hypothetical situation, as I believe it illustrates my contention about subjective morality:
In this example, there are two conflicting sets of morals. In the group one, it was expected that members would subordinate themselves to the will of the strongest member. In group two, they subordinated to the will of the oldest member. When the male from the first group attempted to assert authority over the second group, his actions were viewed as morally wrong, and he was punished by ostracism. When the group ostracized him, the male viewed their behavior as morally wrong, and punished them by attacking. As he attacked them, the group saw his behavior as morally wrong, and killed him for his abusive offenses. The male (as he was dying from his wounds) viewed their murderous response as morally wrong.
I think that each of these hypothetical groups has “absolute morality” by your reasoning. But the lack of universality leads to a situation where members of both groups feel as if the other is morally wrong, and as if they are morally right. It seems perfectly obvious to me, however, that the moral beliefs of neither group has any objective legitimacy. Their behavior is only justified by their own social structure, and only condemned by the structure of the other variant. They cannot be meaningfully compared, even though the two variants are members of an otherwise identical species. Any attempt to do so would use normative beliefs from our own social structure, and would be no different than the judgment they rendered on each other.
I consider it a real possibility that you agree with me about this, that you believe our morality, and that of the story’s hominids, is “objectively” correct within the confines of the given group. If that is the case, however, it’s not really objective at all. The objective fact is that the hominid groups (and humans) hold moral beliefs. It is meaningless to say that any of these beliefs is objectively correct or reasonable, though, because objective facts cannot contradict one another. The fact that these moral beliefs can contradict each other, is evidence that they are purely subjective.
Additionally, this example would be just as instructive if, rather than being instinctive, the groups’ social hierarchies were learned. It makes no difference whether their beliefs are intuitive or cognitive in nature. In point of fact, most beliefs, moral or otherwise, are a combination of both. There exists no obligation for individuals to act in any particular way. If a member of the group one variant had been raised, from birth, by a band of group two, and perfectly followed their social structures, we could not meaningfully say that she was acting immorally by obeying the oldest member instead of the largest one. If her instincts were insuppressible, she would obey the largest member. If her upbringing overpowered this compulsion, she would obey the oldest member. Neither behavior is “better” than the other; it simply “is”.
I’m not sure I can be any more clear or instructive about my position on this matter. I look forward to your response, but I’d like to wrap this up, so I’ll give you the last word.
Hi Cineaste:
You wrote: There is evidence for doing the right thing. I'll say it again, there are mountains of evidence to suggest that the golden rule is good for society. Utilitarianism is one reason I "ought" to follow the golden rule.
A couple of points:
1. Even if there is evidence that the golden rule is good for society, that is not evidence that you ought to follow it. Yuo have no evidence that you should promote the well being of society, you have no evidence that you ought not take personal advantage at the expense of society whenever you can.
2. For there to be evidence that the GR promotes the good of society you have to have an objective definition of "the good of society". There cannot be any evidence that the definition used by whatever study is the right definition.
your Friend
keith
Well crap :) I was rather enjoying this conversation with you.
You are correct. My points are…
1. Innate moral intuitions, as evidenced by the work of Marc Hauser and Frans de Waal, are absolute (not relative to circumstances, culture, belief, personal preference). Moral intuitions are not universal.
2. Human beings, are able to use intellect and reason, as well as culture, to mitigate and shape their innate moral grammar, their “gut reactions” if you will.
3. When presented with moral dilemmas, moral intuition vies with reason as evidenced by brain scans. For example, the famous “Trolley Car Moral Dilemma.” The result is a human morality that is metaphysically subjective (John Searle) and in no way universal but one can certainly make reasonable, epistemologically objective generalizations about them.
4. “The subjectivist then assumes that if you feel a certain way about X, you can’t then be objective about X, since feelings are subjective and “subjective” and “objective” are supposed to be opposites. And if you can’t be objective, you can’t use math or logic, i.e., you can’t reason.
Well, I’ve tried to show here that the subjectivist is wrong. Pain is felt, but it is more than “just feelings”: there’s a lot more we can say about pain than “I feel it” or “Ouch!” In the same way, morality is more than “just feelings” and there’s a lot more we can say about it than “I feel it” or “Yuck!” or “Yay!”. What we’ve just shown is that although moral feelings exist in a metaphysically subjective way, there can still be epistemological objectivity about them. Just as doctors can use epistemologically objective scientific methods to investigate metaphysically subjective matters like pain, so we can use epistemologically objective rational methods to investigate metaphysically subjective matters like moral feelings.
The basic problem with ethical subjectivism, in other words, is not its observation that people have feelings about moral matters. People do have feelings about moral matters; no question about that. But the fact that people have feelings about morality doesn’t disqualify them from thinking about it too. And once you allow that people can reason about morality, you undermine ethical subjectivism entirely, since as a matter of fact, not all arguments are equivalent, some are better than others, and so some people’ s moral claims are objectively more worthy of belief than others — because they are more reasonable.”
This is how we get moral “oughts” (point #4) from the moral “is” (point #1,2,3). I define “ought” as “metaphysically subjective” and not “metaphysically objective.” Mathematics for example, is “metaphysically objective.” “Boiling babies for pleasure is wrong” is “metaphysically subjective” but we use logic and reason, which are “epistemologically objective” to “undermine” (mitigate) the metaphysical subjectivity. It’s how we justify morals. So, I can reasonably say that boiling babies for pleasure is morally wrong because I can provide evidence demonstrating how this behavior is objectively harmful to society. “The task is to reason our way to consensus, and most philosophers assume we are alike enough and reason similarly enough that some arguments will prove more compelling than others.” Stewart, this is why debates about morality are not “meaningless.”
Applying point #4 to your analogy and keeping in mind points 1-3 I’d like to quote Peter Singer again…
“In a dispute between members of a cohesive group of reasoning beings, the demand for a reason is a demand for a justification that can be accepted by the group as a whole.”
In your analogy Stewart I am going to assume the bands are capable of intellectual reasoning. If not, I’ll simply say that their morality is too rudimentary to derive “oughts” grounded in reason. Bear in mind I define “ought” as “metaphysically subjective” not “metaphysically objective.”
My biggest problem with this analogy is there seems to be no reasoning applied within the situation whatsoever. You have constructed it so that there is no communication between the group members and therefore a conflict of misunderstanding was inevitable. If “large male traveler” spoke with “elder matriarch” then a consensus of how one “ought” to challenge for leadership might have been reached using “epistemologically objective” logic and reasoning. For example, “elder matriarch” could have convinced “large male traveler” that the wisest leader was best for group success or conversely, “large male traveler” could have convinced “elder matriarch” that the strongest leader was best for group success. They could have even shared leadership. What’s important here is that they reason their way to consensus. As it is, your analogy attacks the absolute unreasoning moral grammar but does not address the cognitive aspect of morality. Reason mitigates the instinctive gut reaction part of morality by using “epistemologically objective” tools like logic and the scientific method to undermine ethical subjectivism.
And, one can certainly say the behavior of helping the poor is “better” than boiling babies for pleasure. Ask anybody.
“Certainly there are disagreements about ethical matters, but disagreements tend to be over which of several commonly-accepted moral precepts should be applied to a particular case. For example, people disagree about the morality of abortion, but both sides agree that, other things being equal, it’s wrong to take innocent human life; we should take care of children the best we can; some pregnancies are unusually problematic; we should be compassionate towards women facing difficult choices, etc. The task is to reason our way to consensus, and most philosophers assume we are alike enough and reason similarly enough that some arguments will prove more compelling than others.”
Keith,
1. Even if there is evidence that the golden rule is good for society, that is not evidence that you ought to follow it. Yuo have no evidence that you should promote the well being of society, you have no evidence that you ought not take personal advantage at the expense of society whenever you can.
2. For there to be evidence that the GR promotes the good of society you have to have an objective definition of “the good of society”. There cannot be any evidence that the definition used by whatever study is the right definition.
Keith, you sound like Agent Smith :)
Question: Why Mr. Anderson Why? Why, Why Do You Do it, Why? Why Keep Fighting? Do You Believe Your fighting for something, for more than just your survival? Can you tell me what it is? Do you even know? Is it freedom, or truth? Perhaps peace? Could it be for love? Delusions Mr. Anderson. Vagaries of perception. Temporary constructs of a feeble human intellect trying desperately to justify an existence that is without meaning or purpose and all of them as artificial as the matrix itself. Although, only a human mind could invent something as insipid as love. You must be able to see it Mr. Anderson. You must know it by now. You can’t win. It’s pointless to keep fighting. Why Mr. Anderson, why? Why do you persist?
Answer: Because I choose to.
Keith, I enjoy helping people. I ought to follow the golden rule because it makes me happy to do so. If you say it’s just my subjective opinion and not objective evidence, consider…
http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/subjective_objective.html
Hi Cineaste:
you wrote: "Keith, I enjoy helping people. I ought to follow the golden rule because it makes me happy to do so. If you say it's just my subjective opinion and not objective evidence, consider…
I applaud your ability to derive enjoyment from helping others. I know a lot of Christians would disagree, but I believe that Jesus' parable from Matthew 25 makes it clear that theological/philosophical opinions aren't what following Christ is about, and an honest atheist trying to do right by his neighbor, showing compassion and love to those who need help can be pleasing to God, far more pleasing than a self absorbed Christian with correct theology but indifference to his neighbor in need. So in a way this discussion of ours is something of an interesting diversion. On the other hand, if I am right about God it's a good thing that we have God to help us grow into the kind of compassionate love that we were created for. Anyway, about your point…
On the view you've advanced, IF you didn't derive enjoyment from helping other THEN it wouldn't be the case that you ought to. I guess I disagree with that. I don't believe that the reason we ought to help others is because we benefit from it, even if it's the case that we often do. There are times when (absent any eternal considerations) when it is in a person's interest to take advantage of others instead applying the Golden Rule. Still IMO they ought not do so.
your Friend
Keith
What Cineaste wrote:
What Cineaste wrote:
“On the view you’ve advanced, IF you didn’t derive enjoyment from helping other THEN it wouldn’t be the case that you ought to.”
Perhaps evolution determines whether we “ought” to follow the golden rule. There are many moral behaviors that evolution can’t explain and there are many that evolution can explain (in my opinion). The Golden Rule is one of these.
You can make an argument that I am deriving an “ought” from an “is.” However…
Keith, I think the above is why I disagree with you and Stewart about “Is” “Ought.” To me it is obvious that “ought” must be derived from “is” even though I am too ignorant to articulate how…
I know that I said I wanted to wrap this up, but I can’t help myself here: You cited LaFave:
This is the essence of our disagreement. I don’t find this argument compelling, because there are so many counter-factuals, all of which apply to moral thinking as well. If only a single person declared that vanilla tastes better than chocolate ice cream, she would call that an objective fact. If 25% of the population declared it so, she would still not consider it an objective fact. As the percentage rises, however, she would presumably select some high ratio at which to declare that, in fact, the statement was now an objective fact.
By this reasoning, the statement “X is objectively better than Y” is identical to the statement, “Most people believe that X is better than Y”, or perhaps “All people believe that X is better than Y.” For someone who has written a paper called “Thinking Critically About Subjective-Objective Distinction,” I feel dubious about her ability to do so personally. The fact that she declares taste to be a metaphysical experience shows, on at least some level, that she is somewhat confused.
If we maintain that the above statements are identical, then we could objectively state whether vanilla or chocolate ice cream tastes better, for any given point in time. But this statement would say very little about the nature of chocolate or vanilla ice cream, and more about the taste buds of the population in question. We can conceive all sorts of conditions where, without changing anything about vanilla or chocolate ice cream, the truth of “vanilla ice cream tastes better than chocolate ice cream” changes, or where the statement could be both true and false, in different locations. Consider this scenario:
One could say (by your reasoning, not mine) that to the villagers of Koruba’a, it is an objective fact that chocolate tastes better than vanilla. And they could also say that, to the inhabitants of Kiritamari, vanilla objectively tastes better than chocolate. What’s chiefly important, however, is that the objective facts in question say nothing about the attributes of the cacao or vanilla beans; they are exclusively statements about the populations in question. To say that the statements are not subjective is to deny that they are statements about an implied group of individuals, and not actually about the objects of the statement itself.
How can it be the case that vanilla can objectively be both better and worse tasting than chocolate? Even if we look only a single person this is confusing. You might agree that, for any member of the Koruba’a tribe, cocoa tastes better than vanilla. Even if you agree this is subjective, you would state that it was absolute. But what if this anonymous tribesman suffered from a stroke, which caused a lesion in his olfactory cortex. Afterwards, chocolate took on a disgusting flavor to him. What should we think about such an event, which is paralleled by similar events all over the real world, every year? Was chocolate once, objectively and absolutely, better tasting than vanilla, but no longer?
Do you see why I have trouble thinking that these statements are anything but subjective? In order to make them objective you have to add some implied condition, like “Most people believe that…”, or “On the atoll of Kiritamari…”. Truly objective statements like “The sun is 74% hydrogen,” are true or false regardless of who is saying them, or how many people believe them to be true. It is a statement about the composition of the sun, not about the nervous systems of the people who are looking at it. if the truth of a statement varies based on who is stating it, or on the number of people who agree with them, then it’s not really objective at all. Although it may be common, it is still purely subjective.
If you want to say “Most people believe that X is undesirable”, just say that. That’s an objective statement, which is perfectly verifiable. Don’t shorthand it as, “X is bad”, because it’s not really a statement about X at all. It a statement, and a vague one at that, about the number of people who believe that X is undesirable. It’s subject to a great deal of interpretation and confusion. It leads people to believe that there is some inherent attribute of X which is being discussed, and that’s simply preposterous.
Alternatively, if you feel there is some utility to such a shorthand, then please make it’s criteria perfectly clear. What percentage of a population has to believe that X is undesirable for you the believe that the statement “X is undesirable” is objectively true? 90 percent? 95 percent? 99.999 percent? What if I have a different criteria? Why not just state the facts and leave it at that?
Hi Cineaste:
You wrote: "Why should we be moral? Because we are genetically inclined to be moral. It is a heritage of earlier times when less morally inclined and more morally inclined species came under pressure from natural selection. Hence, we do not need divine revelation or strong will to be good; we are simply genetically wired to be good."
It seems to me that you are ignoring the distinction between humans having a genetic inclination to behave morally and having an obligation to behave morally. The evidence you cite at most shows an inclination to behave a certain way; it doesn't establish that you *ought* to behave that way. It seems to me you are comparing apples to oranges.
Also, I think you present a red herring when you object that we don't need divine revelation to do good. I didn't claim such. I claimed merely that Dawkins (and you too it seems) believe that there is a moral obligation to behave well when there cannot be any evidence for such a moral obligation (at most there can be evidence that we have a genetic inclination to good behavior).
your Friend
Keith