The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy [*]

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Abstract: The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy

Much of what we think we know about the origins and spread of liberal democracy needs to be reevaluated. Enlightenment movements seldom fostered stable democracy outside of Protestant majority societies. Moreover, arguments based on resource distribution do not convincingly explain why some societies developed "democracy-friendly" distributions of resources or accurately describe the cleavages that often led elites to disperse political power to lower classes. This article demonstrates historically and statistically that conversionary Protestants (CPs) influenced both the distribution of resources in societies and the rise and spread of stable democracy around the world.

CPs influenced democracy directly by shaping democratic theory and institutions and indirectly by creating religious incentives for elites to disperse economic and political power. CPs wanted people to read the Bible, thus they initiated mass education and mass printing. Moreover, organizational forms and tactics that CPs developed to spread their faith proved useful for sustaining long-term, nonviolent social movements. CPs used these new organizational forms and tactics to transform their home societies and to moderate colonialism. When faced with CP competition, other groups copied these innovations. Without CP competition, they did not and these innovations were delayed for decades, even centuries. Thus, CP competition drastically increased ordinary people's access to education, printed material, news, and organizational resources – whether or not they converted to Protestantism. Moreover, the reform movements spurred by CPs increased the rule of law and fostered the creation of early political parties. Together these factors increased the probability of stable democratic transitions.

Statistically, the historic prevalence of Protestant missionaries explains about half the variation in democracy in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania. This association is consistent in different continents and sub-samples, is robust to dozens of controls, and remains despite instrumenting Protestant missions in 9 different ways. Moreover, most of the variables that dominate current statistical research about democracy become insignificant after controlling for Protestant missions.

1 INTRODUCTION

For many years, arguments based on political culture have been out of fashion. Most theories that dominate current research about democracy emphasize the material interests of different social classes and either ignore or minimize the role of religion (e.g.,Reuschemeyer, Stephens and Stephesn 1992; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). However, human behavior is influenced by religious, moral and cultural factors, not just material self-interest maximization (C. Smith 2003; 2010). If our understanding of human motivation is over-simplified, so will our models be. Models based on a more fully-orbed view of human nature more accurately reflect history and more robustly predict statistically. In fact, we cannot understand the distribution of resources in society, the original rise of representative democracy, the historic expansion of voting rights, or the global spread of democracy without paying attention to religion – particularly conversionary Protestantism.[2]

This article argues that conversionary Protestants (**CPs**) were a crucial catalyst that initiated the development and spread of religious liberty, mass education, mass printing, newspapers, voluntary organizations and most major colonial reforms. In short, CPs helped create conditions that made stable democracy more likely – regardless of whether many people converted to Protestantism. Moreover, religious beliefs motivated most of these transformations. In this blunt form, without evidence or nuance, these claims may sound overstated and offensive. But, the historical and statistical evidence of CPs influence is strong and the cost of ignoring CPs in our models is demonstrably severe.

Past quantitative research consistently suggests that countries with more Protestants are more democratic and have more stable democratic transitions (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Hadenius 1992;

[2] *Conversionary Protestants* (1) actively attempt to persuade others of their beliefs, (2) emphasize lay vernacular Bible reading, and (3) believe that grace/faith/choice saves people, not group membership or sacraments. They are not necessarily orthodox or conservative.

Treisman 2000; Tusalem 2009). Moreover, historical research suggests that Protestantism facilitated the original development of modern representative democracy (e.g., J. Clarke 1994; Bradley and Van Kley 2001; Witte 2007). *Stable* democracy first emerged in Protestant Europe and British settler colonies, and by World War I every *independent*, predominantly-Protestant country was a stable democracy – with the possible exception of Germany.[3] A less stable version of democracy developed in Catholic areas with large Protestant and Jansenist[4] minorities (e.g., France) (Woodberry and Shah 2004; Anderson 2004; Philpott 2004). However, democracy lagged in Catholic and Orthodox parts of Southern and Eastern Europe where Protestants had little influence. A similar pattern exists outside Europe (Woodberry 2004c).

Still, the relationship between Protestantism and democracy is not automatic or uncomplicated. The Dutch Reformed Church generally supported apartheid in South Africa, many German Protestants supported Nazism, white settlers throughout the world typically fought extending democratic rights to non-whites, and Africa, Asia, and Latin America have had their share of Protestant dictators (e.g., Frederick Chiluba in Zambia, Syngman Rhee in Korea, and Ríos Montt in Guatemala). Despite the strength of the statistical association between Protestantism and democracy, the relationship is contingent.

In fact, many argue that the association between Protestantism and democracy is spurious (Moore 1966; Swanson 1967; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). For example, in Europe, pre-Reformation class structures, land-holding patterns and political conditions may have influenced both the spread of Protestantism and the later development of democracy – creating a deceptive association.

Unfortunately, in any given context possible causes are so enmeshed that they are difficult to disentangle. For every proposed cultural or religious "cause," scholars can find an alternative economic or political "cause" and vice versa. To escape this swamp of indeterminate causality I use several approaches: (1) observing the consistent association between Protestantism and democracy in regions with histories

[3] Although Protestants dominated pre-World War I Germany politically, they comprised roughly 45% of the German Confederation and banded together to keep Catholics out of power (Gould 1999, 68).

[4] Jansenists were a Calvinist-like Catholic renewal movement which the Pope condemned as heresy.

and class structures radically different from Europe's, (2) showing historically that CP's had a unique role in spreading mass education, printing, civil society, and other factors that scholars argue fostered democracy, and (3) demonstrating statistical that the historic prevalence of Protestant missionaries strongly predicts democracy in 142 non-European societies using (a) controls for alternative explanations and (b) instrumental variable estimation.

CPs, such as Protestant missionaries, wanted people to be able to read the Bible in their own language and to have "converted" clergy. Thus, as CPs tried to spread their faith, they catalyzed mass education, mass printing, and civil society, which hampered elite attempts to monopolize these resources. Protestants did not always provide the most education, printing, and civil society, but Protestant initiatives spurred others to invest heavily in these areas and to pressure governments to create schools that restricted Protestant content. These resource transfers to non-elites helped alter class structure and fostered the rise of political parties and non-violent political movements.

Moreover, non-state-supported religious groups (i.e., Nonconformists) fought for religious liberty and against state interference in civil society. Thus, in the 18th through early 20th century, CPs generally sided with Enlightenment elites against state churches and their conservative allies. Without this religious support, Enlightenment elites had a small power base and typically set up either autocratic or unstably democratic regimes. Finally, non-state missionaries moderated colonial abuses, particularly when abuses undermined conversions. Thus, non-state missionaries fostering rule of law, less violent reactions to anti-colonial political organization, and peaceful decolonizations. Together, these side effects of conversionary Protestantism (**CPism**) altered class structure and elite incentives in ways that increased the probability of stable democracy. Of course, Protestant economic and political elites were as selfish as anyone else. Protestant slave owners fought slave literacy and Protestant settlers exploited indigenous people; but when CPs were financially independent of the state, slave owners, and white settlers, they undermined these elite co-religionists in ways that fostered democracy.

To make these arguments I combine comparative historical and historically-sensitive statistical research. However, the historical analyses were completed first; the statistics confirm what the historical

analyses revealed and thus are a true statistical test. Moreover, neither the history nor the statistics should be evaluated in isolation. Each mitigates weaknesses in the other approach.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the consistent association between Protestantism and democracy across contexts. Section 3 outlines historical evidence for CPism's direct and indirect influences on democracy. Section 4 presents the data and methods. Section 5 tests the association between missions and democracy statistically. Protestant missions seem to explain about half of the variation in democracy and to remove the impact of most variables that dominate current research. Across extensive controls, robustness checks, and instrumental variable estimation, the Protestant missionary variables remain robust. Finally, Section 6 summaries the evidence and highlights theoretical implications.

2 CONSISTENT ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PROTESTANTISM AND DEMOCRACY

As mentioned previously, Protestantism is associated with stable, representative democracy in Western Europe (*Context 1*). Yet, many argue that this association is spurious (Moore 1966; Swanson 1967; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). However, Protestantism spread to many contexts with different pre-Protestant conditions: i.e., different class structures, land holding patterns, etc. These varying pre-Protestant conditions help adjudicate between theories. If the association between Protestantism and democracy remains consistent regardless of context, the claim that the association is caused by these pre-Protestant conditions becomes less plausible. We now turn to four distinct contexts.

Context 2: Among European-settler colonies, "Protestant-based" US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have been more democratic than "Catholic-based" Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. Both sets of countries had similar *pre-colonial* conditions (e.g., temperate climates, communal land holding, and small indigenous populations). This weakens theories that climate or pre-Protestant class conditions caused the Protestantism-democracy association. Post-settler differences between Protestant and Catholic settler colonies may be influenced by religion and thus be intervening mechanisms rather than competing explanations. *Context 2* also weakens theories that secularization causes democracy (e.g.,

the US is far more religious than Uruguay). Still, all predominantly "Protestant" areas were British colonies and all "Catholic" areas Spanish colonies. Thus colonial institutions may be the crucial factor. Yet whatever the mechanisms are, they seem to be transportable from Europe to other countries.

Contexts 3 & 4: After the fall of communism, Eastern European Catholic and Protestant countries (Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic) had earlier, more stable democratic transitions than did Orthodox and Muslims ones (Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia). Similarly, Protestant and Catholic former Soviet republics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) had earlier, more stabile transitions than did Orthodox and Muslim ones (Woodberry 2000; Anderson 2004). None of these countries were British colonies or had mass immigration from Northwest Europe; this weakens non-religious explanations for the Protestantism-democracy association in *Context 2*. Moreover, all the countries in *Contexts 3 & 4* had similar pre-transition institutions and entered a similar international environment. All had large secular populations and comparable exposure to Marxist and Enlightenment ideas via monopoly state education. In addition, communists eliminated historic differences in land holdings. Yet in both Contexts 3 & 4, religious differences predict both who mobilized against communism and how smoothly states transitioned to democracy. Catholic and Protestant countries were similar, but the transitions were after the Catholic Church's rapprochement with democracy and in areas where Protestants and Catholics competed for centuries. "Non-religious" explanations for the pattern – such as the legacy of Ottoman colonization – might work for Eastern Europe, but not for the former Soviet Union or for *Contexts 1, 2* & *5* (see Tables 17 & 18, online appendix). Nor is it clear that Ottoman "influence" was unrelated to religion.

Context 5: Finally, as we shall see, if we exclude all European countries and all Protestant European-settler colonies from the sample (i.e., *Contexts 1-4*) and analyze the remaining countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania, we still find a statistical association between Protestantism and democracy. Thus, in at least five distinct contexts the Protestantism-democracy association holds. None of these tests

are decisive. It is possible to think of ad hoc alternative explanations in each context. But the consistent association between Protestantism and democracy across all five contexts strengthens the plausibility of causation. It is not clear if any competing theory works in all five contexts or why we should prefer inconsistent explanations over a consistent one.

However, historical analysis suggests that not all types of Protestantism were equally conducive to democratization. In the 18th through mid-20th centuries, non-state-financed CPs instituted and spread many of the reforms that may explain the Protestant-democracy association (see Section 3). While we cannot measure the historic prevalence of CPs in *Contexts 1-4* statistically, we can measure CPs' influence in *Context 5* via the historic prevalence of Protestant missionaries. Section 5 demonstrates that the historic prevalence of Protestant missionaries explains the variation in democracy better than Protestantism in general. Moreover, Protestant missions predict democracy while Catholic missions do not. Yet there is no evidence that land-holding patterns (or other theories used to discount the Protestantism-democracy association in Europe) shaped the spread of Protestant missionaries but not the spread of Catholic missions (e.g., see Tables 19 & 20, online appendix).

Some may think missions' influence was too anemic to foster democracy, but prior to the mid-20th century, missionaries were the main source of information about life in the colonies (Fairbank 1985; Tudesco 1980, 56; Hutchison 1987, 1). Moreover, missionaries constituted one of the largest and most educated groups of Westerners in the nonwestern world – most had college degrees when that was rare (Hutchison 1987; Daughton 2006). In the Anglo-Protestant world, missionary organizations dwarfed labor unions and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[5] In fact, in the 19th century, the largest mission organizations outstripped all but a few commercial banks as the largest and wealthiest corporations in the US (Hutchison 1987; Hall 1994; Chabbot 1999, 226-231). Yet, scholars often argue that labor unions, NGOs, and financial interests influenced democracy. Moreover, as we will see,

[5] I have not been able to find comparable financial data elsewhere.

Protestant missions powerfully predict democracy and are amazingly robust to controls and other methods of mitigating omitted variable bias.

3 HISTORICAL EVIDENCE:

The arguments in this article are based on over twelve years of global-historical research, not formal modeling or a few case studies. They involve the confluence of many different strands, which together increase the probability of stable democracy. This section briefly outlines the historical evidence that CPs influenced democratic theory and institutions and expanded mass printing, mass education, civil society, and rule of law. These dispersions of power and resources increased GDP, expanded the middle class, and forced most "Protestant" colonizers to devolve power to non-Europeans via elections earlier than "Catholic" colonizers. These conditions altered elites' incentives and engendered both a party system and electoral experience before independence – increasing democratic stability after independence.

Wherever possible, I demonstrate these argument first in Europe and North America and then in Africa, Asia, Oceania, and Latin America. The European and North American evidence is crucial because both representative democracy and the intermediate mechanisms this paper emphasizes first developed there. If CPism create conditions favorable to democracy, we must find plausible links between CPs and each mechanism in the places where the mechanism first appeared: Europe and North America. The non-European evidence strengthens the plausibility of causation because it undermines alternative theories proposed for Europe – i.e., claims that the association between Protestantism and democracy in Europe is caused by preexisting differences in class structure, land tenure, etc. However, Protestant missions spread to areas with completely different pre-colonial class-structures, land-tenure systems, and methods of governance. If Protestant missionaries consistently promoted democracy-friendly institutions in these new contexts, it suggests that non-religious explanations for European behavior may be wrong or insufficient.

3.1 The Origin of Democratic Theory and Institutions: While many scholars emphasize the Athenian and Enlightenment roots of modern democracy, religious factors were also important. Modern democracy

is different from Athenian democracy,[6] and Enlightenment theorists incorporated many legal and institutional innovations from religious movements (H. Berman 1983; Waldron 2002; Witte 2007; Nelson 2010). In fact, arguments for political pluralism, electoral reform, and limitations of state power were originally framed in religious terms (J. Clarke 1994; Ihalainen 1999; Bradley and Van Kley 2001; Witte and Alexander 2008; Nelson 2010).

Calvinists tried to reconstruct states along "godly" lines and most "Enlightenment" democratic theorists came from Calvinist families and/or educations, even if some were not personally religious (e.g., John Locke, Rousseau, Hugo Grotius, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton),[7] and they secularized ideas previously articulated by Calvinist theologians and jurists (Hutson 1998; Witte 2007; Nelson 2010).[8] For example, Hobbes' and Locke's social contracts are secular versions of the Puritan covenant, and Locke's ideas about the equality of all people is explicitly religious (Waldron 2002; Woodberry and Shah 2004).

Furthermore, the strength of Calvinism and Nonconformism better predicts where democracy emerged than does the strength of Greek and Enlightenment influence. Greek classics were most consistently available in the Eastern Mediterranean, but democracy did not thrive there; the Roman Empire circled the Mediterranean, and the Renaissance flourished in Southern Europe, but democracy did

[6] Athenian democracy was direct, limited to elite hereditary Athenian families, excluded over 80% of Athenians, never expanded to Athenian controlled territories, and was unstable. Modern democracy has elected representatives, separation of powers, constitutions, "natural" rights, legal equality, and broad citizenship (J. Berman 2008:169-70).

[7] Montesquieu had a Calvinist wife and based many of his arguments on England during the period of Puritan hegemony.

[8] e.g., natural rights, the social contract, separation of powers, and freedom of expression & association: "…every one of the guarantees in the 1791 [US] Bill of Rights had already been formulated in the prior two centuries by Calvinist theologians and jurists" (Witte 2007:31).

not thrive there either. The "Athenian seed" germinated only after 2,100 years in alien soil: northwest Europe and North America. Thus, areas with later and weaker exposure to Greek thought would have to have had "stronger effects." At a minimum, some additional catalyst seems likely.

Moreover, religious context influenced whether Enlightenment-linked revolutions birthed stable democracy. The "Protestant" English and Scottish Enlightenments were not anti-Christian, and where they spread, democracy flourished. The "Catholic" French Enlightenment was virulently anti-Christian (particularly anti-Catholic) and where it spread, stable democracy did not. The French Revolution devolved into violence and inspired both totalitarianism and democracy (Talmon 1970). Similarly, anti-clerical Enlightenment governments formed in virtually every independent Catholic country in Europe and Latin America, but did not lead to stable democracy (at least not without many decades of instability) (Helmstadter 1997). Some anti-clerical Enlightenment governments clung to power for almost a century before democratizing (e.g. Mexico, Uruguay). Similarly, Freemasons promoted Enlightenment ideas and spread in most colonies, but remained elitist allies of imperialism and did not disperse power to non-whites or the poor (Rich 1991; Fredrickson 2002; Daughton 2006, 87-97; Harland-Jacobs 2007). Even in independent Latin American – where Masons fought old hierarchies – they limited membership to men with property and "honorable" professions – hampering power dispersion (Solano 1990).

In fact, careful historical work suggests that religious factors were crucial to the emergence and stabilization of democracy in Europe (Rokkan 1970; Kalyvas 1996; Gould 1999; Ertman 2010; Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010, 946-47). For example, even in 19th-century Great Britain, the expansions of suffrage and reforms of the electoral system were directly tied to pressure by Evangelical Anglicans and Nonconformists - in this case, including non-state Catholics (Ertman 2010).[9] Similarly, in Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands, competition between religious groups with Evangelicals, Nonconformists, and Enlightenment elites on one side and conservative defenders of the state church on the other spurred

[9] Although Protestants were central to many of the early stable democratizations in Europe, in the 20th century Catholic parties often played a crucial role in democratic consolidation (Kalyvas 1996).

competitive expansion of suffrage into the lower classes and facilitated democratic consolidation (Machin 1977; Stephen 1979; Madeley 1982; Thung, Peelen and Klingmans 1982; Ellens 1994; Gould 1999). Different religious cleavages fostered the origin, expansion, and stability of democracy elsewhere in Europe (Van Kley 1996; Gould 1999; Bradley and Van Kley 2001).[10] Thus, modern democratic theory and institutions are a confluence of streams, not a uniquely Athenian or Enlightenment creation. Although the Enlightenment was important, it is not a sufficient explanation for democracy. Religious ideas, institutions, conflicts, and social bridging were also important. In summary, the ideas that shaped the first successful democratic movements were heavily influenced by Protestantism, not just by "secular" classical and Enlightenment thought. Moreover, ideas are not enough. Without conditions that dispersed power beyond a small elite and prevented a life-and-death struggle between secular and religious forces, democracy did not last. In the next historical sub-sections I discuss how CPs fostered greater separation between church and state, dispersed power, and helped create conditions under which stable democratic transitions were more likely to occur.

3.2 Printing, Newspapers & the Public Sphere: One mechanism through which CPs dispersed power was massively expanding access to printed material and news. Scholars often claim printing and capitalism birthed the public sphere and the public sphere enabled democracy (Habermas 1989; Zaret

[10] In Switzerland, Protestants and Enlightenment elites mobilized against Catholics in consolidating democracy at the national level (although the earlier subnational pattern is more complex). In Belgium, Catholics and Enlightenment elites united to break away from Dutch Protestant domination. Later, when Catholics and Enlightenment elites began to compete over education, Catholics (who were popular among the peasantry) expanded suffrage to stay in power. In France Protestants were weak and anti-clerical enlightenment elites squared off against the Catholic Church, creating an unstable and illiberal transition to democracy. In Germany, revivalist Protestants (Peitists) remained within the state church, and as the Prussian Empire expanded, Protestants united to keep the Catholic majority out of power (Gould 1999).

2000). But without CPs, mass printing, newspapers and the public sphere were greatly delayed. First, CPs changed people's ideas about who books were for. According to CPs, *everyone* needed access to "God's word"— not just elites. Therefore, *everyone* needed to read: including women and the poor. Moreover, books had to be in language that was accessible to ordinary people, not in foreign languages or classical versions of local languages. Second, CPs expected lay people to make individual religious choices. They believed people are not saved through sacraments or group membership but by "true faith in God"; thus, each individual must decide. CPs used printed material to try to convert people, which forced other groups to print to compete for ordinary people's allegiance. This competition helped birth mass printing.

The consequences of CP printing are clear from the shifts in where most printing occurred in Europe. Before the Reformation, Italy had the largest printing industry, but Protestantism made little headway there and printing did not increase rapidly or birth either an early "public sphere" or mass literacy (Graff 1987, 112-119). In contrast, England initially had little printing (Graff 1987, 115), but CPs used print to mobilize ordinary people, forcing their elitist enemies to respond. This spurred newspapers, printed debates, and an early public sphere (Zaret 2000). CPs had similar effects in continental Europe – e.g., Germany, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Febvre and Martin 1976, 287-319; Eisenstein 1979, 312-452; Melton 2001). However, non-state Protestants were weaker there, and extended religious wars destroyed early gains. Still, from the 1600s on, Protestant areas consistently printed more books per capita and exported more printed material per capita than Catholic areas (Eisenstein 1979, 403-23).

In the West, CP movements also predict many of the major shifts in the quantity and techniques of printing. For example, CP Bible and tract societies helped spark a 19th century printing explosion. Their drive to print mass quantities of inexpensive texts *preceded* major technological innovations and helped spur technological and organizational transformations in printing, binding, and distribution that created markets and eased later adoption by commercial printers (Howsam 1991; Bayly 2004, 357; C. Brown

2004; Nord 2004; I. Bradley 2006, 38-9).[11] Before this, commercial publishers generally fought mass printing to keep prices high, even in Great Britain (St. Clair 2007). Although markets and technology are important, they are not sufficient to explain the timing or locations of major increases in printing.

CPs' importance is even clearer outside Europe. Religion influenced both whether countries printed and whether printing led to mass literacy, newspapers and a public sphere. First, religion influenced whether elites valued printing. Christians, Jews, and Mahayana Buddhists adopted printing without CP competition (none were *primarily* monastic and all had long, non-poetic religious texts that are difficult to memorize). However, Muslim, Hindu, Theravada Buddhist and other societies in Asia and North Africa were exposed to printed books and printing presses by Chinese, Mongols, Jews, Asian Christians, Catholic missionaries, and European trading companies for hundreds of years before they printed any books. By the 1600s, Europeans had created accurate fonts for most major Asia languages and exported texts in them. The Portuguese even gave the Mogul emperor a printing press and fonts in the early 1600s, but no one used them (Woodberry 2011c). Yet, many Asian economies rivaled or surpassed Europe through the late 18th century (Maddison 2001), so the delay was not caused by lack of exposure, technology, markets, or economic development.

To most elites printing seemed ugly, spread books to those "not qualified to interpret them," and undermined elite status/control. Jews, Eastern Christians and trade companies printed for themselves (mostly in "foreign" languages) and Catholics printed few texts (not mass propaganda). This printing did not threaten local elites' ability to control discourse or overwhelm their ability to respond orally or with manuscripts. Thus, Muslim, Hindu, and Theravada Buddhist elites resisted change.

[11] Nineteenth-century Bible and tract societies were among the largest corporations of any kind (Hall 1994:34, 44). For example, from 1829 to 1831 the American Bible Society printed and distributed over a million Bibles when the US had about three million households, no railroad system, and a dispersed rural population (Nord 2004:84).

When Muslims, Hindus, and Theravada Buddhists printed, it was usually a response to mass printing by Protestant missionaries or those trained by them (e.g., Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, Persia/Iran, Malaysia, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, Thailand) (Woodberry 2011c; Green 2009).[12] CPs printed so many vernacular texts that it forced elite response. For example, within 32 years of importing a press to India in 1800, three British missionaries printed over 212,000 copies of books in forty languages and, along with other missionaries, created the fonts and paper that dominated South Asian printing for much of the 19th century (Ghosh 2003, 27; F. Ross 1999, 40-77, 118; Khan 1961). This spurred both Hindu and Muslim response, but the earliest Indian printers learned their skills at mission presses and most early non-Christian Indian imprints were religious – often rebuttals to missionary tracts (Khan 1961; Aggarwal 1988, 2; Ghosh 2003; Shaw 2007; F. Robinson 2000, 77). In fact, in most Asian societies early indigenous printers gained their skills and equipment from Protestant missionaries (Woodberry 2011c; Green 2009).

CPism also shaped printing's "consequences." If printing was a *sufficient cause* for mass literacy, newspapers and the public sphere, then we would expect these developments to have originated in China, Korea, or Japan, but they did not. China, Korea and Japan all printed six- to eight-hundred years before Europe; China and Korea had movable-font metal type before Europe; Japan had movable-font metal type starting in 1590, and Korea and Japan had phonetic alphabets – which facilitate literacy and make moveable-font efficient. All three countries had high economic development and thriving mercantile classes. However, until CPs arrived in the 19th century, printing never supplanted manuscripts,

[12] The two possible exceptions (Egypt and Ottoman Turkey) are too complex to expound here, but missions *may* still be crucial. Protestant missionaries printed and distributed thousands of texts in Arabic, Turkish, and other local languages just before rulers in these countries bought printing presses. Moreover, in Ottoman Turkey the two earliest printers were both former Protestants (one from Hungary and one from Scotland) (Woodberry 2011c; Green 2009). Still, the lack of scholarship and its often nationalist tone makes demonstrating a direct link between missionaries and the rise of local printing difficult.

newspapers did not develop, and literacy remained primarily the prerogative of elite men (Davis 1994; Su 1996; Duchesne 2006, 82-3; Reed 2007).

Protestant missionaries and their local associates consistently spurred mass education, mass printing, social movement organizations (SMOs), and public debates, which birthed a public sphere (*Asia*: Lent 1981; *China*: Dunch 2001; Zhang 2007; *Korea*: Davis 1994; Choi 1997; *Japan*: Altman 1966; Huffman 1997). Protestant missionaries printed the first East Asian newspapers (in Chinese);[13] Chinese reformers copied them (Dunch 2001, 78; Zhang 2007), as did Japanese and Koreans (who read mission publications in Chinese and visited missionaries while their countries were still closed) (Inglehart 1959, 40; Altman 1966, 23-7, 37, 41-2; Y. Shin 1984; K. Shin 1999; Lutz 2008, 92-6). Christian converts published the first privately-printed Japanese- and Korean-language newspapers (Davis 1988; Huffman 1997, 30-1, 410).[14] Protestant missionaries also reintroduced moveable-font metal type (which Asians had abandoned) and developed the fonts and techniques that dominated 19th and early 20th century printing throughout East

[13] The Chinese, Korean, and Japanese governments printed earlier gazettes of official regulations and views and supplied them to officials, but not to ordinary people. These government mouthpieces did not spur broad public debate or a "public sphere" (Reed 2007). Most historians distinguish these from newspapers.

[14] The first privately-printed, Korean-language newspaper (the *Independent*) was edited by Philip Jaisohn/ Sŏ Chaep'I – a Protestant teacher at a mission school. Missionaries encouraged him to publish it, provided the trained printing staff free of charge, and continued printing the paper after he fled Korea (Davis 1988). The first privately-printed Japanese-language newspaper was printed by Hamada Hikizō/ Joseph Heco (a Protestant who had worked with missionary printers) and Kishida Ginkō (a student of the missionary Joseph Hepburn) (Huffman 1997:30-31, 410; Lutz 2008:92-96). An earlier government-printed paper was a translation of a Chinese-language missionary newspaper – minus the religious content. Access to this paper was restricted to high government officials (to help them monitor developments outside Japan) and thus did not influence ordinary people (Altman 1966: 37, 41; Shin 1999: 3, 34-36).

Asia (Altman 1966, 100-7; Su 1996; Zhang 2007; Lutz 2008, 173-5). Similarly, Protestant missionaries initiated newspapers in most other non-European societies (Woodberry 2011c).

Technological knowhow is necessary, but not sufficient, for printing, newspapers, and the public sphere. CPs were also important; they transformed who books were for and printed content that threatened elites' control of religious interpretation, spurring reaction. Other mechanisms may be possible,[15] but societies that excluded CPs started mass printing later and expanded it more slowly. In fact, as we will see in the statistics section, the historic prevalence of Protestant missionaries strongly predicts cross-national variation in per capita newspaper circulation throughout the 20th century.

CPs were not perpetually necessary to *sustain* a print revolution (markets took over), but CPs were a crucial catalyst. Thus, to the extent that both a vital public sphere and a broad, non-state controlled, printing industry and news media promote stable democracy, we would expect greater democracy in areas that CPs had longer and more pervasive influence.

3.3 Education: Another mechanism through which CPs dispersed power was through spreading mass education. Much statistical research suggests that formal education increases both the level of democracy and the stability of democratic transitions (Bollen 1979; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Barro 1999).[16] However, CPs catalyzed the rise of mass education all around the world.

CPs wanted mass literacy so everyone could read the Bible and interpret it competently. CPs' attempt to convert people through education threatened other elites and spurred these elites to also invest

[15] Fear of military defeat probably also influenced Persia, Egypt, Ottoman Turkey, and Japan, but does not explain why, before Protestant missionary printing, military defeats and threats did not cause similar outcomes or why the number of books these governments printed remained small until after Protestant missionaries were allowed to enter the countries (rather than smuggle texts over the borders).

[16] Democracy does not seem to spur education more than other forms of government. This increases the plausibility that education causally influences democracy (Tsai 2006).

in mass education. In contrast, high education rates by non-conversionary religions (i.e., Jews after the 2nd century CE) did not lead to similar imitation. CPs' centrality to the spread of mass education is demonstrated by (1) who advocated and resisted educational expansion, (2) when education expanded, (3) which regions got more education, and (4) which individuals received more education.

Prior to the late-19th century, economic elites throughout Europe resisted educating women and the poor because they feared it would undermine stability (Graff 1987 153, 174-5, 230-1, 247, 269, 315, 362; Vincent 2000, 26, 77, 80). Religious groups (particularly CPs) countered elite pressure, educated women and the poor, and developed techniques that made mass schooling possible, such as teacher training, child-focused texts, dividing students into age/ability groups, etc. (Graff 1987, 152, 162-3, 231, 246-7, 315-17; Bacchus 1988; Vincent 2000, 38-48; I. Bradley 2006). Even when European governments formed state school systems, they often merely nationalized religious schools (Graff 1987; Bebbington 2006).

Education expanded rapidly after the Reformation and similar religious revival movements. In contrast, education rates did *not* increase with the advent of printing, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment or the Industrial Revolution – at least not in the short term (Johansson 1977; Graff 1987;[17] Vincent 2000, 28-32). Economic development does not seem to have spurred early mass literacy either. The earliest places with near universal literacy (Scandinavia, Iceland, New England, Protestant cantons in Switzerland, Puritan parts of England, and lowland Scotland) were typically economic backwaters, but had Protestant sponsored literacy campaigns (Graff 1987, 13, 246, 292-3; Johansson 1977).

Before the 20th century, countries with more Protestants had higher literacy, provinces with more Protestants typically had higher literacy, and Protestant individuals in the same country had higher literacy (especially women and non-elites). The Catholic Church invested heavily in education where they competed with CPs (i.e., Ireland, North America, and British colonies) or a secularizing state (France), but not in areas with a Catholic monopoly (e.g., Spain, Portugal, and Italy) or Orthodox/Muslim competition (e.g., Eastern Europe and the Balkans) (Higgs 1971; Johansson 1977; van de Walle 1980;

[17] Graff 1987:11-14, 115-25, 135-7, 147-8, 151-2, 174-84, 190-2, 230-1, 244-50, 262, 266-8, 292-3.

Graff 1987;[18] Houston 2002, 157-162; Vincent 2000, 8-11; Woodberry 2004c). Recent statistical work using historical data from Germany shows the relationship between Protestantism and education is very robust and holds up even after the authors instrumented for Protestantism in an attempt to remove omitted variable bias (Becker and Woessmann 2009).

However, despite this extremely consistent association between Protestantism and education, the association may still be spurious because the spread of Protestantism in Europe was socially caused. Fortunately, again, the relationship between Protestantism and education is testable through the missionary movement. Some areas missionaries went were already colonized, others were not, but regardless of where Protestant missionaries went they started schools quickly after arrival. Even colonizer-financed education generally resulted from missionary lobbying (Ingham 1956, 11, 59; Sundkler and Steed 2000, 637, 643; Smyth 2004; Woodberry 2004c). Other religious groups did not emphasize mass literacy prior to Protestant competition in Africa (P. Clarke 1997, 152; Sundkler and Steed 2000, 286), in Latin America (Gill 1998), in Asia (Drummond 1971, 313; Dunch 2001, 3; James 1987; 1989), in the Caribbean (Bacchus 1988), or in the Middle East (Tejirian and Simon 2002);[19] (see Woodberry 2004c for more details).

Moreover, non-missionaries invested little in education regardless of the colonizer. Most whites wanted a small indigenous elite they could control and wanted most education to be manual training (*Southeast Asia*: Kelly 2000; *Africa*: Manning 1998, 98-99; Sundkler and Steed 2000, 636-45; *North America*: McLoughlin 1990; *Caribbean*: Bacchus 1988; *India*: Ingham 1956, 56-61; *Worldwide*: Mackenzie 1993; Woodberry 2004c). Thus statistically, the prevalence of Protestant missionaries strongly

[18] Graff 1987:13, 143-49, 161-4, 169, 220-23, 227-30, 248-9, 297, 301-5, 308, 312, 337, 348, 367,469. The Protestant advantage repeats in the Lesser Antilles – all of which had slave-based, island economies (Bacchus 1988).

[19] In Islamic education boys memorized the Koran in classical Arabic but few became literate (F. Robinson 2000).

predicts both historic and current education rates and removes the impact of many other factors. Moreover, the association between Protestant missions and education is consistent both in cross-national analyses and in sub-national analyses in sub-Saharan Africa, India, and China (Woodberry 2004c; Gallego and Woodberry 2010; Nunn 2010; Bai and Kung 2010; Lankina and Getachew forthcoming).

Religious variation in education between individuals in the same countries further reveals missions' importance. Data from Africa, Asia, and Oceania consistently suggests Christians (especially Protestants) are disproportionately educated and have higher educational expectations for their children (*East Asia*: Zhai and Woodberry 2011; Roemer 2008; *South Asia*: Ingleby 2000, 284, 311; *Middle East*: Prasad 1999, 26; Sharkey forthcoming, 14; *Africa*: Sundkler and Steed 2000, 650-54; Blunch 2008; Laitin 1985; *Worldwide*: Woodberry 2004c). In Latin America, Protestants are disproportionately poor, yet still put a greater emphasis on education than their non-Protestant neighbors (Annis 1987; Brusco 1995; Sherman 1997; Robbins 2004 – although see Steiginga 2001).

Elites all over the world received good educations regardless of religion. But, only some religious groups educated non-elites sufficiently to alter class structure (particularly activist Protestants and religious groups competing with them). Religious beliefs that required everyone to have access to God's word undermined the ability of elites to maintain large educational barriers between themselves and others. Over time, because of religious competition, state education, and diffusion of ideas, religious differences within societies dissipate. For example, in the US Protestants do not have an educational advantage over other religious groups.[20] Moreover, by the 21st century, most religious traditions and governments value mass education – dissipating historical cross-national differences as well. Still, early educational investors reaped disproportionate rewards. New educational systems take resources (trained teachers, books, school buildings, educational expectations) and societies that started the process of mass

[20] In fact, because theologically conservative Protestants tend both to marry and have children earlier and to emphasize mothers staying home with children, women from theologically conservative Protestant backgrounds tend to have less graduate education than other religious groups (Fitzgerald and Glass 2008).

education earlier have more educational resources to facilitate future educational expansions. Plus, ex-colonies often created state schools by nationalizing mission schools (Woodberry 2004c; Sharkey forthcoming). Thus, the distribution of education seems to have some religious roots. To the extent that mass education promotes stable democratic transitions, CPs may have indirectly influenced democracy.

3.4 Civil Society: CPs also dispersed power by developing and spreading new organizational forms and protest tactics that allowed non-elites, early nationalists and anti-colonial activists to organize both non-violent political protests and political parties. Many scholars argue that this type of organizational civil society helped foster democracy (Putnam 1993; Fung 2003).

In Europe, pre-Reformation Catholics founded and expanded legal space for humanitarian organizations (H. Berman 1983; Lynch 2003); Protestants systematized and laicized these organizations (Gorski 2003). Calvinists and Nonconformists did the most to expand legal protection for non-governmental organizations (**NGOs**) and popularize acceptance of organizational pluralism (J. Clarke 1994; Ihalainen 1999; Hamburger 2002; J. Bradley 2005; Witte 2007). Protestant reformers were also the first to use mass publicity and petitions for political campaigns (Walzer 1971; Zaret 2000).

In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, new modular forms of social protest and special purpose organizations emerged in Great Britain and North America, crystallizing in the 1820s and 1830s (Tilly 1995; Tarrow 1998). Not surprisingly, the countries where this occurred had the greatest density of Nonconformist Protestants. Tilly and Tarrow claim urbanization, expanding states and emerging markets spurred these changes. However, even in Europe, Nonconformist and Evangelical Protestants (i.e., CPs)[21] pioneered most of the *non-violent* tactics and organizations they describe – e.g., boycotts, mass petitions,

[21] "Evangelicals" were Trinitarians who emphasized Biblical authority and evangelism (i.e., most Nonconformists and some Anglicans).

signed pledges (Tarrow 1998, 39-41; Morris 1990; I. Bradley 2006).[22] In addition, CPs disproportionately mobilized and signed petitions (Anstey 1975; Drescher 1986; J. Bradley 1990) and virtually all the organizations and movements that crystallized these tactics in the early 1800s were organized and led by CPs (Drescher 1986; Morris 1990; I. Bradley 2006).

In the US, CPs also developed and popularized these new organizations and tactics. Both the leadership and supporters of abolition, temperance, and the other early social reform movements were closely linked to missions. Moreover, these new organizations and tactics emerged concurrently in both the urban Northeast and rural Western frontier (Hall 1992, 33-36; Young 2006; Masters and Young 2007). Because the Western frontier had little urbanization or state penetration, Tarrow and Tilly's theories do not generalize well in North America (Young 2006).

Similarly, in India these new organizations and tactics crystalized in the 1820s and '30s – initiated by Protestant missionaries and copied by those reacting to them (Ali 1965; Oddie 1969; 1978; Woodberry 2004c). Yet, these organizations and tactics did not emerge in France or Northern Europe until the 1840s or in Southern Europe until much later (Tilly 1995, 15). Thus, Tarrow and Tilly's theories about the rise of social movement organizations (**SMOs**) and modular, cross-regional, non-violent protest do not generalize well. The level of state penetration and capitalist development does not seem to have been consistently higher in Great Britain, the Western frontier of North America, and Calcutta, India than in continental Europe and East Asia. Conversely, CPs were active in all the places where early SMOs emerged and restricted in the places where they lagged. Moreover, CPs were disproportionately represented among both the leaders and supporters of the earliest SMOs (Woodberry 2004c). Thus, the prevalence of CPs seems important to the rise of SMOs and nonviolent protest.

[22] The French developed the violent tactics: "secular" urban insurrections and barricades. In addition, some innovators (e.g., John Wilkes) were not primarily religiously motivated. Still, Wilkes was heavily influenced by the Presbyterian minister Andrew Baxter, had great sympathy for Nonconformists, and fought for religious liberty.

In addition, there are theoretical reasons to expect a close link between CPs and the rise of SMOs and non-violent protest. Non-state religious groups had to instill voluntarism and charity in their congregants in order to survive (they cannot tax). In the process of running religious organizations, ordinary people (and especially women) gained habits, skills and networks that they could use for other types of social movements. Conversionary groups also developed techniques for mass propaganda and for precipitating changes in behavior for large numbers of people (e.g., tracts, rallies/revivals, pledges, public repentance from individual and social sins) (e.g., Young 2006; also see Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; C. Smith 1996; Robbins 2004). Revival movements, denominations and missions organizations linked people over broad geographic areas and developed techniques for organizing, financing, and sustaining long-term religious movements. Nonconformist religious groups also fought for the rights of organizations to function outside state control – partially as a way to defend themselves from discrimination and government interference.

Moreover, religious movements linked CP elites with ordinary congregants. When CP elites decided to fight slavery and open colonial territories to Protestant missions, they lacked power to institute reforms without popular backing, but feared popular agitation would spawn chaos. Thus, they borrowed SMO forms and tactics from CP religious organizations and promoted non-violent tactics to prevent the social chaos these elites feared (Woodberry 1996; 2004; Young 2006; I. Bradley 2006, 122-38). Some CPs also had theological reasons for non-violence (e.g., Quakers). However, once CPs used these forms and tactics politically, others learned and developed them without needing religious connections.

Missionaries spread SMO forms and tactics internationally. Early Protestant missionaries tried to reform what they considered abuses in other societies (e.g., foot binding, female genital cutting, widow burning [*sati*], and consummating marriage before age 12) (Woodberry 2004c). Both their conversionary and reform activities sparked reaction. Other religious groups copied their SMO forms and tactics to fight for or against mission-initiated reforms: i.e., signing petitions, weekly meetings, boards of directors, traveling speakers, newsletters (*India*: Oddie 1978; Zavos 2000, 44-7; van der Veer 2001; *China*: Welch 1968; Dunch 2001; Xu 2010; *Sri Lanka*: Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988; James 1989, 289-318; *Middle*

East: Tejirian and Simon 2002; Sharkey 2003; *Korea*: Kang 1997; Grayson 2002; Kim 2003; *Japan*: Drummond 1971; Hane 1982; James 1989, 61-83; *Worldwide*: Woodberry 2004c).

These organizations and tactics had no precedent internationally (Anheier and Salamon 1998, 14-15). Thus, societies with early religious liberty and more Protestant missionaries have more vital voluntary sectors regardless of their current religious makeup (James 1989; 1993; Woodberry 2004c; 2011b) and people who studied at Protestant missionary schools that emphasized indigenization were far more likely to form NGOs and SMOs (Cook 1975; Woodberry 2011a).In fact, the connection between Protestant missions and the rise of NGOs is so pervasive that NGO scholar Estelle James writes, "…a similar institutional form may not exist in economies that do not have a colonial missionary background" (1989, 291).

Current data on both organizations and individuals reflect these CP origins. Wherever we have statistics, Christians – especially non-state Protestants – are the most active creators of organizational civil society, and Protestant or mixed Protestant/Catholic countries and regions have the highest voluntary association involvement (James 1987; Anheier 1989; Grabb and Curtis 1992; Salamon and Anheier 1997; Boli, Loya, and Loftin 1999; Chabbott 1999; Curtis, Baer, and Grabb 2001; Hall 1992, 33-36). Even after controls, Christians (particularly Protestants) are the most likely to volunteer and give both formally and informally (Uslaner 2002; Kim 2003; Chang 2006; Ecklund and Park 2007; Trinitapoli 2007; Bekkers and Schuyt 2008). The consistency of these findings around the world and across levels of analysis (i.e., between countries, regions, and individuals) suggests the association is causal.

Religious civil society is crucial for dissipating elite power because the poor are generally as involved in religious groups as the wealthy (unlike other civil society promoters, e.g., education) (Verba *et al*. 1995, 309-20). Moreover, because religious groups are not *primarily* political, they are more likely to spread and survive during authoritarian regimes (C. Smith 1996, 1-25). Thus, to the extent voluntary organizations and non-violent social movement organizations promote stable democracy, we would expect greater democracy in areas where CPs had longer and more pervasive influence.

3.5 Colonial Transformation: CPs also dispersed power by publicizing colonial abuses, changing colonial policy, and transferring ideas, skills, and networks that helped colonized people organize anti-colonial and nationalist movements. Although scholars often suggest British colonialism fostered democracy (e.g., Bollen and Jackman 1985; Midlarsky 1998), this may be because CPs had greater influence in British colonies. CPs forced the British to allow religious liberty, but were not able to do this in historically Catholic regions. Religious liberty increased the flow of Protestant missionaries to British colonies, increased competition between religious groups, and freed missionaries from direct state control. When free from direct state control, missionaries were better able to limit colonial abuses and spur mass printing, mass education, and organizational civil society. Religious liberty also made it easier for local people to organize early non-violent anti-colonial and nationalist organizations.

All historically-Catholic colonizers (France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Belgium) and all post-colonial Latin American states controlled religious groups. These "Catholic" states appointed or approved bishops, paid priests' salaries, and excluded or severely restricted CPs (Helmstandter 1997; Tudesco 1980; Woodberry 2004c). Although most historically-Catholic states had periods with anti-clerical governments, anti-clericals did not foster religious liberty. In the colonies, anti-clericals either continued pro-Catholic/anti-Protestant policies or imposed draconian restrictions on both Protestants and Catholics.

Initially the British acted similarly; they funded Anglican priests to serve whites and restricted missionaries. In Asia, Protestant missionaries retreated to Danish colonies and in the Caribbean they had no right to work with slaves. However, in 1813 CP lobbying blocked the British East India Company (**BEIC**) charter, forcing the BEIC to do three things: to allow missionaries to enter BEIC territories, to finance education for non-Europeans,[23] and to allow anyone to be involved in trade – not just employees of the monopoly BEIC (i.e., initiating the beginnings of free trade in British colonies). Over time, CP lobbying further expanded education and missionaries' independence from colonial control (Walls 1996,

[23] Thus, the BEIC was forced to provide funding for education in India about 20 years before the state provided funding for education in England.

241-54; Helmstandter 1997; Turner1998). The US, Australia, and New Zealand instituted similar religious freedom in their colonies, but the Dutch did not. Until 1935, the "Protestant" Dutch controlled missionaries (Neill 1966, 170-202; Van den End 2001). Thus, I expect Dutch colonies to have similar democratic outcomes to "Catholic" ones.

Under conditions of religious liberty, non-state missionaries moderated colonial abuses because of their unique bridging position and incentives. Although indigenous peoples were hurt most by colonial abuses, they had little power in colonizing states. Colonial officials, businesspeople and settlers had power, but benefited from abuses and lacked incentives to fight them.

However, missionaries were different. First, many 19th and early 20th-century Protestant missionaries came from politically activist traditions. In much of Northwest Europe and in English settler colonies (excluding the slave-holding US states), the Protestant missions movement was closely tied to social reform movements such as abolitionism and temperance. Thus, many missionaries perceived reforming society as a natural extension of their faith (Etherington 2005; Young 2006; Masters and Young 2007). Second, mission work was hurt by abuses because abuses angered indigenous people against Christianity – which many indigenous people associated with the colonizers. Finally, missions had power to fight abuses because they wrote regularly to supporters in colonizing states. During the 19th and early 20th centuries Europeans and North Americans got most of their news about colonized territories from missionary periodicals, and the mission movement made people care about distant people they otherwise could have ignored (Woodberry 2004c; 2006a; 2006b; Miller and Stanczak 2009; Stamatov 2010).

In British and American colonies, religious liberty and private mission financing weakened officials' ability to punish missionaries – freeing them to critique abuses (Greenlee and Johnston 1999, 34-38), while popular support allowed missionaries to punish colonial officials and settlers (Oddie 1978; 1996; Stocking 1987, 240-54, 272; Turner 1998; Woodberry 2004c; Etherington 2005). Thus, Protestant missionaries spurred immediate abolitionism (Woodberry 2004c; 2006a; 2006b; Stamatov 2006), as well as movements to protect indigenous land rights, prevent forced labor, and force the British to apply similar legal standards to whites and non-whites (Knaplund 1953; Oddie 1978; Chaudhuri 1998; Turner

1998; Clements 1999; Woodberry 2004b; 2004c; 2006b; 2011a; Grant 2005; Etherington 2005; Gladwin 2007). Others participated in these movements, but missionaries provided information and photographs that documented atrocities. Missionaries also provided emotional connections to distant people and mobilized large groups through church talks and mission presses. Without missionaries, mobilizing mass protests would have been difficult (Woodberry 2004b; 2004c; 2006a; 2006b; Grant 2005; Etherington 2005; Stamatov 2010). This missionary mobilization made it more difficult for the British to sustain colonial violence or to apply different legal standards to whites and non-whites. Thus, missionary mobilization helped create a cocoon where non-violent, indigenous political movements could develop and increased the incentives for colonial officials to allow gradual democratization and decolonization.

Protestant missionaries also transferred ideas, skills and networks that made non-violent, indigenous anti-colonial, nationalists and pro-democracy movements easier to develop and sustain. A significant minority of Protestant missionaries directly promoted democracy and equality through their teaching, translation, and support of nationalist organizations (Drummond 1971, 152-155; Fairbank 1985; Stanley 1990, 133-155; Mackenzie 1993; Frykenberg 1999, 183-184; Ingleby 2000, 327; Dunch 2001, 22-24; van der Veer 2001, 36; Robert 2000; 2002; Woodberry 2004c; 2011a).

Moreover, after 1813 when the mission lobby blocked the BEIC charter, the British could not ban Protestant missionary printing, education, or SMOs without risking political backlash in parliament. However, the British needed Hindu, Muslim, and other elite cooperation to run their colonies; thus, officials could not easily ban Hindus, Muslims and others from printing and organizing SMOs in response to CPs (e.g., Woodberry 2004c; Frykenberg 2008). This put "religious liberty colonizers" in a quandary. Once vernacular printing flourished, it was difficult to control and spurred political organization/agitation. Thus, "religious liberty colonies" had a more vital indigenous press, and, as we will see, countries with more Protestant missionaries continue to have greater newspaper circulations.

Similarly, British colonies received more education than others (Kamens 1988; P. Clarke 1997; D. Brown 2000), but Protestant missionaries initiated education for non-elites, pressured the government to fund it, and spurred others to copy. British colonies have no educational advantage once Protestant

missions are statistically controlled (Woodberry 2004c). Large mission-educated populations motivated the British to hire more non-Europeans – who gained skills running bureaucratic institutions prior to independence. This increased postcolonial stability and state capacity (T. Smith 1978; Lipset 1994).

British colonies also had more civil society than other colonies, but again, CPs fostered this. In British Africa and Oceania virtually all of the early political organizations were formed by Protestants – often by Protestant ministers. Even in "Catholic" Africa, Protestants disproportionately formed political organizations (Stanley 1990; Sundkler and Steed 2001: 320-21, 654, 972-73, 985; Robert 2000; 2002; Woodberry 2004c; 2011a – also see Laitin 1985).

In Asia and the Middle East conversion to Protestantism was less common, but Protestants spurred others to form voluntary and political organizations – although Protestants formed a far higher proportion of voluntary and political organizations than their proportion of the population (Ingham 1956; Drummond 1971, 152-155; Fairbank 1985; Stanley 1990; Kang 1997; Deol 2000; Dunch 2001; Grayson 2002, 160-162; Xu 2010; Robert 2000; 2002; Woodberry 2004c). When Protestant missionaries tried to reform local customs, local elites reacted by forming their own organizations and copying missionary tactics. Originally these SMOs were not anti-colonial and so the British allowed them to thrive. However, these organizations developed cross-national networks, resources, newspaper readerships, and experienced, publically-recognized leaders, and they became increasingly anti-colonial. Nationalists deployed these resources to resist colonialism and form political parties: e.g., in India, many leaders of the Indian National Congress Party and RSS[24] came from SMOs originally developed in reaction to Protestant missions (Prasad 1999; Deol 2000; Zavos 2000; van der Veer 2001; Frykenberg 2008, 284).

When these religious SMOs became anti-colonial they were too powerful to crush easily. They forced the British to gradually transfer power and allow people to run political parties and participate in elections before decolonization (Woodberry 2004c). Thus, in most British colonies, political parties developed without ties to a revolutionary army. This made it harder for early political leaders to crush

[24] Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or National Volunteer Corp

political opposition with the military. Moreover, civil society that developed during the colonial period generally continued after independence. In fact, the historic prevalence of Protestant missionaries continues to predict the strength of civil society cross-nationally (Woodberry 2011b), and countries that had multiple political parties and elections prior to independence were more likely to have stable transitions to democracy (Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005; Wilkinson 2008).

Of course, missionaries had their own abuses; some were even racist. Moreover, they often did not oppose abuses as quickly or strongly as later nationalists would have liked. Missionaries had to balance outrage with pragmatism to avoid restrictions and expulsions by both governments and white settlers. Because most missionaries viewed conversion as their primary goal, they often ignored abuses that did not hamper it (Woodberry 2004c; Miller and Stanczak 2009). Moreover, when colonial officials selected missionaries or paid their salaries, missionaries generally did not protest abuses. Still, missions initiated most reforms that occurred during the colonial period and popularized the idea of "trusteeship" – i.e., that the only justification of colonization was the "social uplift" of colonized people (Porter 2004; Woodberry 2004c; Etherington 2005; I. Bradley 2006). While missionaries were often paternalistic, colonization would have been far worse without them. To the extent that either colonialism or the process of decolonization influenced democracy, we would expect greater democracy in former colonies where non-state Protestant missionaries had more influence.

3.6 Catholic Missionaries: Catholic missionaries opened schools and printing presses – some prior to Protestants. But this education and printing was initially limited and elite-focused. It did not threaten local elites' ability to control texts or education, and did not spur powerful reactions from other religious groups like Protestant education and printing did. Catholic missionaries also protested colonial abuses: especially members of religious orders in the 15th, 16th, and late 20th centuries (e.g., Dominicans and Jesuits). However, their 15th and 16th century protests did not engender long-term change because they were personal appeals to aristocrats, not organized pressure groups that outlasted sympathetic individuals (Stamatov 2006). Moreover, "Catholic" colonies maintained tight control over missions and easily

punished priests who complained. From the late-18th to mid-20th centuries the Catholic Church struggled incessantly with Enlightenment elites throughout continental Europe and Latin America. The Church typically aligned itself with conservative forces to demonstrate its value to colonial states. During this period, Catholic missionaries seldom protested colonial abuses – even when Protestant missionaries did (e.g., the Belgian Congo) (Hochschild 1998, 134, 216-18, 242-44, 252, 264; Hastings 1994; Rosenberg et al. 2003, 552; Woodberry 2004b; 2004c; 2011a). After World War II, and particularly after Vatican II (1962-65), this changed, and Catholic missionaries became among the most vocal critics of abuses (Philpott 2004; Woodberry 2011a). However, this article focuses on the legacy of missions prior to 1965.

3.7. Caveat: Protestant Missions and Violence: Although this paper focuses on how Protestant missions fostered democracy, sometimes they hampered it. Protestants typically translated texts into and educated in the vernacular – which may have accentuated tribal distinctions (Ranger 1999, 178). Moreover, Muslims typically shunned missionary education more than other religious groups. Thus, Muslims had less exposure to Western education and organizational forms than others (e.g., in British India, Lebanon, Ottoman Turkey, Nigeria, etc.). The British often accentuated these religious and ethnic cleavages by blocking missionaries from working in particular regions – e.g., preventing missionaries from working in Muslim areas in Nigeria and in predominantly Buddhist areas in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and Myanmar (Burma). This could create the type of spatial inequality that seems to foster ethnic and religious violence (Cederman, Wiedmann and Gleditsch 2011). The British also labeled some peripheral groups with limited exposure to missionary education "martial races," and disproportionately hired them into the military (Woodberry 2004c; Enloe 1980) and employed divide and rule tactics (Laitin 1985). At independence violence erupted between those who disproportionately benefited from missionary education and those who had not in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, India/Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma, and elsewhere.

Historical Summary & Foundations for the Statistical Models: Calvinists and Nonconformists contributed to democratic theory and institutions out of concern to limit state power, to guard against the

corruptibility of all humans and human institutions, and to justify rebellion against rulers who restricted them. Later democratic activists used some of these ideas and institutions to establish representative democracy (Anderson 2004; Woodberry and Shah 2004; Witte 2007). In most parts of Protestant Europe, conflict between CPs and defenders of state churches divided economic and political elites and created incentives for these elites to extend voting rights to previously excluded groups. Because of this close historical connection between CPs and democracy, most CPs did not consider democracy a threat to their religion and many actively promoted it.

Moreover, CPs helped foster conditions which facilitated democracy by spurring religious liberty, dispersing mass education, printing, and organizational civil society, and restricting extra-legal use of violence, forced labor, and land confiscation. These reforms undermined elites' attempts to "monopolize" resources and increased elites' incentives to allow democracy. Figure 1 outlines these arguments visually.

Figure 1 about here

Religious liberty fostered the independence of organizations from state control and increased the willingness of religious groups to critique the state. Mass printing and education increased ordinary people's access to scientific information, which helped spur the creation and adoption of new technologies and promoted economic growth. Mass education and printing also enabled previously marginalized groups to gain wealth, expanding the middle class. Both economic development and larger middle classes are associated with greater democracy. Broadly accessible newspapers also increased ordinary people's knowledge of politics, pressured governments to justify their behavior relative to public opinion, and expanded the pool of people who were able to mobilize political pressure against the state.

The new social movement organizational-forms and tactics CPs introduced helped people pressure the state non-violently. In the colonies, these organizations and tactics allowed nationalists to develop non-military political parties and to pressure Protestant-religious-liberty-colonizers to gradually devolved power to local people. CP monitoring of colonial officials made it more difficult for colonial officials to

kill non-violent protestors and made democratic political compromises more likely. Moreover, after independence, political parties had a long history of peaceful competition and no links to guerilla armies, had greater difficulty deploying the military to crush political opposition. However, Protestant missionaries were not randomly distributed around the globe. I argue that many of the variables that dominate previous statistical research about democracy are associated with democracy because they shaped where Protestants missionaries went or are spuriously associated with Protestant missions. The next two sections analyze the statistical evidence for these claims.

4 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: This section discusses the variables used in this article to analyze the association between missions and democracy in a sample of 142 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania. This sample excludes Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Because of the strong association between Protestantism and democracy in these "Western" countries, the following regressions are a conservative test of CP influence.

4.1 Dependent Variable:

Democracy: Democracy is measured in two ways. The main measure is each country's *mean* democracy scores from 1950-1994 using data from Bollen (2001) and Paxton (2002) (**BP**).[25] BP's variable has many advantages: (1) it includes more countries than most, (2) has a range of 0-100, which allows OLS, and (3) minimizes rater bias (many other democracy scales systematically favor particular types of countries) (BP 1998; 2000; Treier and Jackman 2008). To minimize rater bias, BP combines information from multiple scales. Still, to ensure robustness, models were rerun using the mean Polity IV score from 1950-2007.

[25] Bollen (2009) describes BP's methods. Because countries gained independence at different dates and Bollen's method changed in 1975, I also control "*Year of 1st Democracy Data*" and "*Only post-1975 data*" in *all* regressions. These controls have little influence, so they are not shown in the tables.

4.2 Independent Variables:

Mission Variables*:* Two variables measure the impact of Catholic missions: "*Foreign Catholic Priests per 10,000 population in 1923*" and *"Years Exposure to Catholic Missions.*" Other variables measure the impact of Protestant missions: *"Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 population in 1923*" and "*Years Exposure to Protestant Missions.*" These variables come from Woodberry 2004c and Woodberry *et al*. 2010. A third variable, "*Percent Evangelized by 1900*" comes from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) and estimates the percent exposed to Christian witness by 1900. The interpretation of this variable is less clear, because it is a retrospective estimate and includes both Europeans and Catholics – not just indigenous people exposed to Protestant missions. Finally, *"Interaction of Catholic & Protestant Missionaries*" is the 1923 Protestant mission variable multiplied by the 1923 Catholic missionary variable.

Other Means of Diffusion: Western democracy may have diffused internationally via either European settlers or particular types of colonization rather than via Protestant missionaries. Past research consistently suggests former British colonies are more democratic (e.g., Bollen and Jackman 1985; Midlarsky 1998) and have more stable democratic transitions than other non-European countries (Treisman 2000; Clague et al. 2001). Other scholars suggest that British colonialism's impact was greater when the British used direct colonial rule or forced settlement (Lange 2009; Owolabe 2010). This article controls for these alternative theories using the following variables. *"Percent European"* is from Barrett (1982). Colonial powers were divided into five groups: "*British Colony*," "*Other Religious Liberty Colony*" (US, Australian, New Zealand, South African, and Danish),[26] "*Dutch Colony*" (a Protestant *religious restriction* colony), "*Catholic Colony*" (French, Spanish, Portuguese, Belgian, and Italian), and "*Non-colony*." France and Belgium were democracies, but their colonies are not more democratic than other Catholic colonies – therefore, all "Catholic" colonies are grouped together. "Catholic" colonies are

[26] The Germans severely limited *non-German* missionaries and sometimes burned mission stations (Neill 1966, 386-411), but lost their colonies in WWI and other countries became the "primary colonizers."

the reference category.[27] Lange (2009) measures direct colonial rules with "*Percentage of court cases decided in customary courts*" and "*Number of colonial police officers per 1,000 population.*" This article uses his variables. *"Forced settlement colony*" is reconstructed from Owolabi (2010).

***Measured "Exogenous" and Pre-Colonial Conditions**:* Many scholars argue that oil, geography, climate, and European settler mortality influenced democracy (Hadenius 1992; Clague et al. 2001; Ross 2001; Acemoglu et al. 2001; 2008; Engerman and Sokoloff 2008). However, climate, geography, and mortality might also channel the flow of missionaries. Thus, we must control these non-social causes in order to isolate the effect of social/endogenous causes such as missions. *"Latitude"* is each country's mean latitude. *"Island Nations"* are countries surrounded by water, plus Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Papua New Guinea. *"Landlocked Nations"* lack access to the ocean. "*Major Oil Producers*" produce as much or more oil per capita than Algeria. Results were similar using "*OPEC member*" instead. "*Literate Culture before Missionary Contact*" indicates countries that had written languages prior to missionary contact. These variables and eleven additional geo-climatic controls are from Woodberry (2004c) and Woodberry et al. (2010). "'*Settler' Mortality Rate*" data is from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (**AJR** 2001),; "*Life Expectancy in 1940*" from Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), and "*Urbanization in 1500*" and "*Population Density in 1500*" from AJR (2002).

Other Factors that Influenced Colonizers and Missionaries: Some factors that influenced colonizers and missionaries are difficult to measure directly and so I measure them indirectly via behavior. "*Date Country 1st Sighted by Europeans after 1444*" measures when Europeans first sighted each "country," and thus when colonization or missions became possible. "*Gap between Sighted and 1st Missionaries*" measures how promising missionaries considered each country relative to cost of entry. "*Gap between*

[27] The analyses in this article use "main colonizer," but the results do not vary if I use length of colonization, log length of colonization, or last colonizer. See Woodberry 2004c for coding.

Sighted & Colonized" measures how valuable colonizers considered a country relative to the cost of colonization. Disease and powerful militaries made entry more costly. Disease prevalence is related to distance from the equator (bacteria and mosquitoes thrive in hot climates that never freeze), and military strength is related to written communication prior to missionary contact (societies with a written language were usually had more sophisticated technology). Thus, "*Interaction of Missions Gap & Latitude,"* "*Interaction of Missions Gap & Pre-Mission Literacy,"* "*Interaction of Colonial Gap & Latitude,"* and "*Interaction of Colonial Gap & Pre-Mission Literacy"* attempt to measure delayed entry because of disease or military strength. In addition, "*Number of Times a Territory Switched Colonizers"* measures the value of colonies – only valuable colonies are worth fighting over. If "Protestants colonizers" took the best colonies from "Catholic colonizers," then both colonial and mission coefficients could be biased. Thus, I also measure "'*Protestant' Colonizer Took Colony from 'Catholics.'*"

Endogenous & Intervening Variables: Some proposed causes of democracy result from social processes (i.e., are endogenous) and, thus, their distribution must be explained. In this article they can either be interpreted as alternative theories or intervening mechanisms between missions and democracy. These proposed causes of democracy include economic development (e.g., Bollen and Jackman 1985; Geddes 1999), education (Bollen 1979; Barro 1999), Islam, Protestantism, and secularism (e.g., Midlarsky 1998; Barro 1999; Clague et al. 2001). "*Natural Log GDP per capita: Mean 1960-1994*" come from the World Bank (2002). "*Mean Secondary Education Enrollment Rate: 1960-1985*" and "*Earliest Available Secondary Education Enrollment Rate*" come from Barro and Lee (1994). Data begin in different years so models also control for "*Year of First GDP Data*" and "*Year of First Education Data*" (coefficients not shown to save space). *"Percent Muslim," "Percent Protestant,"* and *"Percent non-religious"* are from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001).

4.3 METHODS: This article uses two statistical approaches to test missions' relationship to democracy. The first approach is to carefully theorize historically plausible alternative explanations and statistically

control for them.[28] If Protestant missions significantly predict democracy after these controls, then they may influence democracy. However, we can never know if some unmeasured factor explains the associations we find (i.e., omitted variable bias). The second approach is instrumenting. If (1) we find a variable that is caused *externally* to the system we are analyzing and it strongly predicts Protestant missions, but does not influence democracy through any mechanism not in the regression; (2) we predict Protestant missions using this instrument; and (3) we use these predicted values for missions in the regression, then we have removed omitted variable bias and can make causal claims. However, we can never prove we have an appropriate instrument (Deaton 2010). Both approaches have unprovable assumptions – but these assumptions are different. Fortunately, both procedures produce similar results, which strengthen the plausibility of causation. Tables 1-4 control for alternative theories using robust regression - a procedure that moderates the impact of influential cases (Stata 2007, 205-210).[29] Table 5 uses instrumental variable estimation (IV) of a non-recursive causal analysis. Many additional regressions are in the online appendix.

5 RESULTS: Table 1 shows that Protestant missions strongly predict democracy. The first regression (column 1) is similar to previous studies and does not control for missions. British colonies are almost 14

[28] Many factors shaped where missionaries went: e.g., temperate climates, ocean access, conversion rates, the prevalence of earlier Christians (i.e., Eastern Orthodox), media attention (e.g., Capt. Cook's Voyage), colonial regulations, and ethno-linguistic diversity (Nunn 2010; Tables 12, 14, 19 & 20, online appendix). Some of these factors seem unrelated to democracy (e.g., media attention), some may be positively related to democracy (e.g., temperate climate, British colonization), or negatively related to democracy (e.g., conversion rates were higher among the poor and marginalized and the desire to convert people of "every language, tribe, people and nation" pushed missions to remote and tribalized areas). Thus, it is not clear whether omitted variable bias would strengthen or weaken the missions/democracy association.

[29] Results were comparable using OLS or OLS with robust standard errors.

points more democratic than former "Catholic" colonies on a 100-point scale; "Other religious liberty colonies" are about 25 points more democratic. "Dutch colonies" and "Non-colonies" are similar to "Catholic" ones. Countries that are islands, are landlocked, have high latitude, have more Europeans, have fewer Muslims, or have "no written language prior to missionary contact" are also more democratic.

(Table 1 about here)

Model 2 adds three missionary variables: years of exposure to Protestant missions, number of Protestant missionaries per 10,000 inhabitants in 1923, and percent evangelized by 1900, and *all three strongly predict democracy*. This consistent association strengthens the plausibility of causality. Each variable comes from different sources and is unlikely to share measurement error. Reverse causation is also unlikely given the dearth of democracy in the sample prior to 1923.[30]

Moreover, all previously significant associations disappear. Variables related to missionary access and mortality (*latitude*, *island*, *landlocked*), alternative means transmission (*percent European*, *colonizer*) and resistance to mission influence (*percent Muslim*, *written language prior to mission contact*) no longer matter. In addition, the changing colonial coefficients match colonizers' policies on religious liberty. Initially, all religious liberty colonies were more democratic (i.e., British and US/Australian/ New Zealand), but the religiously restrictive Dutch were not – despite being Protestant and democratic. After controlling for Protestant missions, religious-liberty colonizers are similar to "Catholic" colonies, and the Dutch are worse (the Dutch had early Protestant missionaries but controlled them like "Catholic" powers).

The changes in adjusted R-squared between models 1, 2, & 5 also highlight missions' importance. When we control for Protestant missions, adjusted R-squared jumps from .340 to .446. If we drop all

[30] In1923 most countries in the sample were colonies and neither non-colonies nor former colonies were unusually democratic or hospitable to CPs.

variables except Protestant missions and Dutch colonization, adjusted R-squared *increases* to .452. This implies that the variables in model 1 add little predictive power to the Protestant missions regression.

The interpretation of "*Percent evangelized by 1900*" is ambiguous (it contains both Protestants and Catholics), but direct measures of Catholic missions do not predict democracy. The interaction between Protestant and Catholic missions is also insignificant. These insignificant Catholic variables make it harder to argue that the association between Protestant missions and democracy is spurious. The numbers of Protestant and Catholic missionaries are positively correlated (.428, $p \leq .000$) and the lengths of Protestant and Catholic missionary activity are also positively correlated (.237, $p \leq .005$). Ease of access, disease, local receptivity, etc., presumably influenced Protestants and Catholics similarly, and omitted variable bias should spread to both. Moreover, in Tables 19 & 20 (online appendix) the sign and significance levels of coefficients predicting the prevalence of Protestant and Catholic missionaries between countries and between electoral districts of India are generally consistent – except for variables related to colonizers. Furthermore, scholars do not use the factors that influenced missionaries' spread to explain the patterns of democracy in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, or the former Soviet Union (Contexts 1, 2, & 4), and only use one factor (British colonialism) to explain differences in democracy between British settler colonies and Spanish Settler colonies (Context 2).

In addition, there is substantial statistical evidence that Protestant missions are significantly and robustly correlated with the intermediate mechanisms outlined in the historical section. Protestant missions are associated with higher educational enrollments in both cross-national (Woodberry 2004c) and sub-national analyses (Woodberry 2004c; Gallego and Woodberry 2010; Nunn 2010; Bai and Kung 2010; Lankina and Getachew forthcoming). Protestant missions are also associated with high newspaper circulation (Table 21), more organizational civil society (Woodberry 2011b), greater economic development (Woodberry 2004a; Bai and Kung 2010), stronger protection of private property, greater rule of law, and lower levels of corruption (Woodberry 2006c).

Finally, the association between Protestant missions and democracy is so strong that if omitted variable bias caused it, the omitted variable(s) must powerfully predict both democracy and Protestant missions (but not Catholic missions). The following tables test several possibilities.

First, perhaps colonialism's influence was measured incorrectly. Of course, results do *not* change if we use length of colonization, log length of colonization, main colonizer or last colonizer, but perhaps the crucial factor is how drastically the British replaced preexisting institutions, not how long they stayed. Lange (2009) argues that in British colonies greater *direct rule* fostered democracy. He measures direct rule with (1) proportion of cases decided in British courts vs. customary courts and (2) the number of colonial police per 1,000 people. Yet, if we limit the sample to British colonies and control for Protestant missions, the positive association between direct rule and democracy disappears. Conversely, controlling for direct rule does not reduce the missionary coefficients and Protestant missions "explains" over half the variation in democracy between different British colonies (Table 7, online appendix).

Alternatively, Owolabi (2010) argues that countries where colonizers used forced settlement (i.e., slavery) and wiped out preexisting populations are more democratic than other colonies because forced settlement destroyed both tribalism and pre-existing institutions – enabling a more complete transfer of European democratic institutions. However, Table 8 (online appendix) demonstrates that controlling for forced settlement does not diminish the Protestant mission coefficients. Moreover, forced settlement only predicts greater democracy in places with a long history of Protestant missions. Thus, forced settlement may have opened non-whites to mission influence and prevented the Protestant tendency for vernacular translation and vernacular education from accentuating tribal divisions (because slavery obliterated indigenous language use and tribal distinctions). Moreover, historical analysis of slave-colonies suggests that white settlers fought to prevent non-whites from gaining freedom, education, land-rights, independent political organizations, and voting rights – whereas Protestant missionaries fought for non-whites to gain access to these things (e.g., Turner 1998; Dick 2002: Woodberry 2004c; 2006a; 2006b; 2011a). Thus, the influence of Protestant missionaries seems to be a plausible explanation for Owolabi's findings.

Second, perhaps geography and climate are not sufficiently controlled. However, Protestant missions still predicts democracy even if we add eleven additional geographic and environmental conditions to the model (i.e., *temperature in coldest month, freezes during year, temperature in hottest month*, a*nnual precipitation, high temperature* precipitation, percent wetlands, percent mountains, percent with river access, mean distance to coast, mean elevation*, and *malaria endemic*) (Table 10, online appendix). Thus, disease prevalence, geography and climate don't seem to remove missions' effect.

Third, perhaps unmeasured factors related to either ease of access or perceived desirability of countries to missionaries or colonizers create a spurious association between missions and democracy. Presumably, Europeans more quickly colonized countries they considered valuable and missionaries more quickly entered countries they considered inviting. To the extent that they chose better places, variables related to the length of colonization or missions may be biased. Furthermore, "Catholic" colonizers restricted Protestant missionaries, channeling Protestants to "Protestant" colonies. Because "Protestant" colonization developed after "Catholic" colonization, Protestant countries either colonized areas Catholic countries ignored (e.g., North America and parts of Africa and Oceania) or invaded Catholic colonies. Because the Protestant British and Dutch developed better navies than the Catholic Spanish, Portuguese, French, Belgians or Italians, Protestant colonizers could take the territories they considered most valuable. If so, Protestant missionaries might flow to already advantaged areas. Unless we control for this selection process, we may credit Protestant missionaries for creating preexisting conditions.

(Table 2 about here)

Table 2 controls for (1) historic ease of access from Europe (measured by date of "discovery"); (2) the perceived value of each territory to missionaries (measured with three variables), and (3) the perceived value of each territory to colonizers (measured with five variables). However, neither ease of access nor perceived value to missionaries either predicts democracy or removes the missions coefficients

(models 2-4).[31] Although variables related to the process of colonization predict democracy, they do not remove the missions coefficients; despite 25 controls the missions coefficients barely budge (models 4 & 5). However, the significant coefficients related to the process of colonization in Table 2 suggest that previous research about colonization's impact is biased because it treats both the length of colonization and the identity of colonizers as exogenous – which they are not.

(Table 3 about here)

Fourth, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR) argue that European mortality accentuated how exploitive European colonizers were and thus undermined the rule of law in high-mortality countries (2001).[32] If European mortality also influenced the spread of Protestant missionaries, this might bias results. Thus, Table 3 controls for both European "settler" mortality and life expectancy in 1940. However, "settler" mortality data are sparse and the sample plummets to 58; thus, insignificant variables were dropped to minimize collinearity. Model 1 shows the significant missions coefficients in the full sample (N = 142); and model 2 in AJR's sample (N = 58) without controlling for "settler" mortality. Adding "settler" mortality shrinks adjusted R-squared and has no effect on the missions coefficients. Similarly, "*Life expectancy in 1940*" neither affects democracy nor diminishes the missions coefficients.[33] These regressions challenge previous research about mortality's effect on political institutions; "settler" mortality does not influence democracy after controls for Protestant missions.

Elsewhere, AJR (2002) argue that Europeans instituted forced labor and extractive institutions in societies with high urbanization and population density before 1500. Thus, AJR claim countries that were

[31] One interaction is marginally significant in model 3, but insignificant after controls in model 4.

[32] Other scholars criticize AJR (Albouy 2008; Fails and Krieckhaus 2010), but as of Nov. 5, 2010 AJR (2001) has 852 citations on the *Social Science Citation Index* and 3,846 citations on *Google Scholar*.

[33] "Protestant missionaries in 1923" becomes insignificant because of the sample, not the control.

better off before colonization are worse off now. Pre-colonial urbanization and population density might also channel Protestant missionaries – biasing missions coefficients. However, Table 3 removes this concern as well. Reducing the sample to the 86 countries with AJR population density data makes "Protestant missionaries in 1923" insignificant, but the other missions variables remain highly significant. Controlling for "*Population density in 1500*" does not influence the missionary coefficients and reduces adjusted R-squared. Similarly, controlling for "*Urbanization in 1500*" reduces the sample to 35, causing problems with collinearity (thus, one of the three missionary variables was dropped), but has no influence on the missionary coefficients, and adjusted R-squared decreases.

(Table 4 about here)

Fifth, democracy research often focuses on socially-caused factors such as secularization, education and economic development. Table 4 tests several of these alternate explanations against Protestant missions. Because these socially-caused factors are measured after missions, they can be viewed as either controls or ways missions influenced democracy. Countries with a higher percent non-religious are less democratic, although the coefficient becomes insignificant after controlling for Protestant missions. This suggests that secularization does not foster democracy. Countries with a higher percent Protestant are more democratic, although again the coefficient becomes insignificant after controlling for Protestant mission. This suggests that religious competition diffused democracy-friendly behaviors to others, or that religion is crucial only when institutions first form, or that religion's influence is slow. Similarly, *ln* GDP per capita is insignificant and does not diminish Protestant missions coefficients. Using different functional forms of the GDP variable does not change the results. Reducing the sample from 142 to 85 to match the education sample makes "Protestant missionaries in 1923" insignificant. But, controlling for education does not remove missions' association with democracy either.

Of course in these regressions, GDP, education and religion are measured concurrently with democracy, which can cause problems with bi-directional causation. Thus, these regressions should not be

viewed as a definitive test of GDP, education, or religion's influence on democracy. Still, Protestant missions are robust to even these controls.

Sixth, perhaps some unmeasured factor related to a particular region drives the association between missions and democracy. However, Protestant missions is associated with greater democracy in most regions of the world (i.e., in Asia, Oceania, and Sub-Saharan Africa, although not in the Americas) (Table 9, online appendix). Controlling for region does not remove the Protestant missions coefficients either (Table 16, online appendix). Similarly, dropping societies with large Eastern Orthodox Christian populations, countries colonized by the Ottoman Empire, or Caribbean islands and predominantly Muslim countries does not change the results (Tables 17 & 18, online appendix). This consistency across very different samples increases the plausibility of causality. Perhaps some omitted variable exists in all these contexts that is powerful enough to create the strong association between Protestant missions and democracy – but it becomes harder and harder to state concretely what that omitted variable might be.

Seventh, perhaps Bollen and Paxton's democracy measure (**BP**) is biased. To test this, I reran the regressions using mean democracy scores from Polity IV (1955-2007). However, Polity includes 24 fewer countries than BP. If we use BP's democracy measure in the Polity sample, the same three mission variables are significant without controls; and two of the three are significant with controls. If we switched the dependent variable to Polity IV, the pattern of significant missionary coefficients is identical (Table 6, online appendix). Switching democracy measures does not influence Protestant missions' association with democracy. Thus, BP's measure is preferable because of its larger sample and minimization of rater bias (e.g., see Treier and Jackman's [2008] critique of Polity and praise of BP).

Table 5 about here

Finally, another approach to omitted variable bias is instrumental variable (IV) estimation, and there are several plausible excluded instruments: *Latitude, Landlocked, Mean temperature in coldest month, Mean temperature in hottest month,* and *percent mountains*. These variables (1) predict Protestant

missions, (2) are likely to influence democracy only through mechanisms controlled for in the regression (e.g., missions, colonization, percent European, or disease prevalence) and (3) are sufficiently distinct that if they influence democracy, the mechanisms are likely to be different (i.e., "latitude" and "temperature" are related to disease and "landlocked" and "percent mountains" are related to access). Moreover, to further minimize the risk of correlation with the error, I added additional geo-climatic controls (i.e., included instruments) related to disease: *Percent of country that freezes during year and Malaria endemic*, plus *Mean temperature in coldest month, Mean temperature in hottest month*, and *percent mountains* when they are not used as excluded instruments.

Moreover, we can test the assumption that the excluded instrument is uncorrelated with the error in two ways. We can use two excluded instruments in the IV regression and run an over-identification test, or we can rotate the excluded and included instruments and check if the formerly excluded instruments predict democracy when missions is instrumented in a different way (e.g., first using "*latitude*" as the excluded instrument while including "*minimum temperature*" and "*landlocked*"; then using "*minimum temperature*" and "*landlocked*" as the excluded instruments while including "*latitude*").

Table 5 shows two sets of IV regressions for each Protestant mission variable. Table 11 & 13 in the online appendix show additional IV regressions and Tables 12, 14, & 15 show the first stage regressions for these models. "*Protestant missionaries in 1923*" has weak instrument problems in most regressions, but the other mission variables do not.[34] Moreover, all tests suggest the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error (i.e., the Woodridge's robust score tests of over-identifying restrictions are never significant and formerly-excluded instruments do not predict democracy in second stage regressions when included as explanatory variables). Results are identical using Polity IV, or using GMM or LIML.

None of the IV regressions are decisive individually. For any excluded instrument, it may be possible to posit an alternative way it influenced democracy without leaving traces in the over-identification tests

[34] Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest the F statistic should exceed 10 for reliable inference based on the 2SLS estimator with one endogenous regressor and one or two exogenous excluded instruments.

or second stage regressions. However, the consistently significant missions coefficients regardless of instrumenting strategy make this contention harder to sustain. There would need to be an alternate story for each IV regression. Moreover, the historical evidence and OLS regressions already make a strong case that Protestant missions influenced democracy. The IV regressions supplement this previous evidence.

6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION:

Both historical and statistical evidence suggests CPs promoted democracy – although often through indirect means. In all five contexts analyzed (i.e., Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, European settler colonies, and mission territories), Protestantism is associated with democracy. In broad comparative historical analyses, CPs consistently initiated and spread factors that past research suggests promote democracy (e.g., mass printing, mass education, civil society, and colonial rule of law). In cross-national statistical analysis Protestant missions are significantly and robustly associated with higher levels of printing, education, economic development, organizational civil society, protection of private property and rule of law and with lower levels of corruption (Woodberry 2004a; 2004c; 2006c; 2011b; 2011c and Table 21). Moreover, wherever they have been tested, these patterns repeat at the subnational level (Woodberry 2004a; Gallego and Woodberry 2010; Nunn 2010; Bai and Kung 2010; Lankina and Getachew forthcoming). Finally, statistical analysis suggests that Protestant missions are strongly and robustly associated with democracy. In fact, missions seem to explain about half the variation in democracy outside Europe and survive dozens of controls and robustness checks.

If the association between Protestant missions and democracy was caused entirely by omitted variable bias, the omitted variable(s) would need to be both more strongly correlated with democracy than any variables in this article and strongly correlated with Protestant missions, but not correlated with Catholic missions (even though Protestant and Catholic missions are highly correlated). More concretely,

the correlation between Protestant missions and democracy is .690.[35] If Protestant missions did not cause democracy, then in a properly specified model the correlation would be zero (rather than .690). If the causal correlation is zero, then the .690 correlation in the regressions is merely the product of the omitted variable(s)'s correlation with democracy and the omitted variable(s)'s correlation with Protestant missions. This requires a mean correlation of .831 with each (.831 * .831 = .690). If true, the omitted variable(s) should be nameable because it would virtually dictate both democracy and Protestant missions. None of the variables used in this article have correlations close to .831, including the three measures related to Protestant missionary activity – which have correlations between .121 and .213.

Moreover, the relationship between Protestant missions and democracy holds in widely different samples (i.e., sample sizes used in this paper vary between 26 and 142. The relationship holds if we change regions of the world, if we limit the sample to British colonies, if we drop Muslim societies and Caribbean islands, if we change measures of democracy, or if we do instrumental variable estimation in nine different ways. While any piece of this evidence can be critiqued, the cumulative evidence makes finding a *consistent* alternative explanation extremely difficult. If alternative explanations are not consistent between contexts and methods, it is not clear why we should prefer them over an explanation that works consistently across such a wide variety of contexts and methods.

Additionally, controlling for Protestant missions removes the effects of most variables that dominate current statistical research about democracy. Even if one still thinks the relationship between CPs and democracy is caused by omitted variable bias, the associations highlighted in most published research suffer from the same problem – either because this research does not control for Protestant missions or because it does not control for the omitted variable(s) that cause the missions-democracy relationship. Either way, much of what we think we know about the roots of democracy needs reevaluation.

[35] The *unadjusted* R-squared from the Protestant-missions-only model is .476 (Table 1, model 5), and $\sqrt{.476} = .690$ because $\sqrt{r^2} = r$.

The historic prevalence of CPs is not the only cause of democracy, but CPs seem both important and neglected in current research. This does not mean that CPs consistently had greater direct support for democracy, nor is mass conversion to Protestantism necessary. But by trying to spread their faith, CPs expanded religious liberty, overcame resistance to mass education and printing, fostered civil society, moderated colonial abuses, and dissipated elite power. These conditions laid a foundation for democracy and long-term economic growth. Once CPs catalyzed these transformations and others copied them, CP's unique role diminished. Eventually other traditions justified religious liberty, mass literacy, etc., and began promoting conditions that foster democracy on their own (e.g., the Catholic Church after Vatican II – which ended in1965). Thus, in countries with a long history of religious liberty and religious competition (such as the US), contemporary CPs do not seem unusually supportive of democracy, education, or the other intervening mechanisms outlined in this paper. However, the culture and institutions of the US already carry the residual influences of CP competition.

That said, conversionary, non-state religions seem particularly able to undermine elite social reproduction. Elites can "monopolize" economic, educational and political resources, but not "souls." Even marginalized people retain the power of private belief. Elites may restrict public alternatives, but when religious options emerge, marginalized people disproportionately convert (for example, African-Americans disproportionately convert to Islam in the US and "tribal" people to Protestantism in Asia and Latin America). If one religious group provides resources to non-elites, the dominant group must respond or risk losing converts. For instance, in the Indian sub-continent, high caste Hindus did not organize to assist *dalits* ("untouchables") prior to mass *dalit* conversion to Christianity (Oddie 1978; van der Veer 2001; Frykenberg 2008).

Similarly, Protestant inroads in Latin America helped trigger Catholic mobilization on behalf of indigenous peoples (C. Smith 1991; Trejo 2009). Trejo's research on Mexico (2009) shows that in areas with successful Protestant missions, both conservative and liberal bishops expanded education and organized indigenous communities politically; elsewhere they did not. Because the Catholic Church has

far more resources and personnel in Mexico than do Protestants, Catholics provided more educational and political resources than Protestants did. But Protestant missions were the catalyst.

Moreover, the Catholic Church provided far more education and created more organizational civil society in countries where it competed with CPs (e.g., the US and Ireland), than in places it historically could block competition (e.g., Mexico, Spain and Italy). As in Mexico, CPs do not always provide more educational and political resources to non-elites than dominant religious groups provide. But CP initiatives consistently threatened dominant religious groups and triggered these groups to transfer resources to non-elites. Widespread education and dispersed organizational resources diminish power distinctions and undermine elite social reproduction. Therefore religious competition and conversion often anger elites, but benefit the poor and marginalized. Effective threats to elite power could be non-religious, but in the cases I analyzed, few were.

Non-conversionary religious pluralism, exposure to new ideas, and retarded economic development were not sufficient to spur mass education, printing, etc., in the regions and periods I studied; elites had to feel their local religious position threatened before undermining distinctions between themselves and others. Religious incentives had to overcome their long-term economic and political incentives. For example, most South Asian and Middle Eastern societies knew about printing for centuries, had religious pluralism and active markets, and recognized Europe's economic and military prowess. But until CPs printed masses of conversionary literature, indigenous elites did not print.[36] Similarly, broad male literacy financially benefited Jews in Europe, North Africa, and Asia (Botticini and Eckstein 2005). But Jews did not use education to proselytize and their financial success did not spur imitation; CP education did.

However, not all religious competition is the same. Historically, CP competition spurred mass education, mass printing, and civil society; earlier Catholic, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist missions did not – at least prior to the mid-20th century. Because different types of religious competition generate

[36] With the possible exceptions of Mohammed Ali in Egypt and some Protestant converts to Islam in Ottoman Turkey.

different outcomes, cultural analysis is necessary. This article is not the place to outline a full culture theory, but CPs' consistent behavior across hundreds of contexts, denominations and years challenges theories that emphasize cultures' incoherence and detachment from values. CPs' consistency suggests an internal cultural logic, not grabbing whatever cultural tool is at hand. Religious imperatives to convert *individuals* and have these individuals read the Bible in their own language seem to have spurred CPs to consistently create *new* cultural tools for mass education and text distribution.

Still, regardless of the details of cultural theory, social scientists should take culture and religion more seriously. Religious groups are not merely interchangeable with any other voluntary organization – distinct theologies and organizational forms lead to distinct outcomes. Thus, if new forms of Protestantism put less emphasis on education than previous versions, competition with these groups is less likely to spur an educational response.

Moreover, many assume class structure, education, and "material" factors are "hard" and determine "malleable" culture. Thus, scholars often give "hard" factors pride of place. If religion is associated with an outcome, many assume it is "really" caused by omitted "hard" variables, but if income inequality is associated with this outcome, they do not assume it is "really" caused by omitted cultural variables. Yet, CP religious competition seems to have influenced class structure by dispersing education to women and the poor, making texts widely available, spawning civil society among non-elites, and moderating abuses of power – with demonstrable economic and political consequences. While "class structure" may shape elites' economic and political incentives, "class structure" is not as "solid" or "foundational" an explanation as it seems. "Class structure" is, in fact, caused – partially by religion. Like yin and yang, "material" and "cultural" factors continually influence each other.

A century ago Max Weber argued that Protestantism shaped what we consider "modernity" (1958; 1968). Some of his causal mechanisms may be wrong, but his main intuition seems right – religious beliefs and institutions matter. Thus, while some scholars think they have closed the door on Weber and can explain economic and political outcomes merely with material self-interest maximization and class-based analyses, Weber's "spirit" may reenter through a different door.

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Figure 1: Theorized Mechanisms through which Conversionary Protestants Influenced Democracy



Table 1: OLS Regression Predicting Democracy in "Nonwestern" Societies: Mean Level of Democracy from 1950-1994					
Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
British Colony	13.97**	2.60	4.58	4.23	
	(5.00)	(5.70)	(5.80)	(5.85)	
Other Religious Liberty Colony	24.58*	16.05	18.14	15.61	
	(12.23)	(11.60)	(11.77)	(12.01)	
Dutch Colony	8.04	-35.30+	-33.30	-34.83	-44.73**
	(17.92)	(21.16)	(21.11)	(21.35)	(16.37)
Never Colonized Significantly	1.97	.35	2.76	3.54	
	(8.54)	(7.73)	(7.78)	(8.22)	
Latitude	.57*	.04	.06	.07	
	(.23)	(.23)	(.22)	(.23)	
Island Nation	14.65*	4.43	4.84	5.00	
	(5.71)	(5.46)	(5.41)	(5.45)	
Landlocked Nation	-12.59*	.34	2.70	2.97	
	(5.96)	(5.98)	(6.19)	(6.23)	
Percent European	.21+	.14	.14	.14	
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	
Percent Muslim	-.16*	.03	.04	.04	
	(.08)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	
Major Oil Producer	-7.08	-4.58	-3.45	-3.39	
	(6.32)	(5.74)	(5.73)	(5.77)	
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	-11.65*	-4.63	-4.55	-4.00	
	(5.64)	(5.27)	(5.24)	(5.30)	
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions		.13*	.13*	.13*	.15***
		(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923		3.77*	3.92*	5.24**	4.39***
		(1.48)	(1.57)	(2.10)	(1.27)
Percent Evangelized by 1900		.23**	.19*	.17*	.28***
		(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.05)
Years Exposure to Catholic Missions			.02	.02	
			(.02)	(.02)	
Foreign Catholic Priests per 10,000 pop. in 1923			.88	1.61	
			(.99)	(1.29)	
Interaction of Catholic & Protestant Missionaries[a]				-.25	
				(.29)	
N	142	142	142	142	142
Adjusted R-squared	0.340	.446	.450	.443	.452

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space. Regressions also control for "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only." Coefficients and standard errors from robust regression (rreg in Stata), R-squared from OLS.

[a] Uses a mean differentiated interaction term.

Table 2: OLS Regression Controlling for the Process of Colonization					
Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
	Model 3 from Table 1	Perceived Value to Missions	Perceived Value to Missions	Perceived Value as Colony	Drop Insig. Variables (except direct effects of interactions)
Also Control for All Variables in Table 1, Model 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Latitude	.06	.02	-.30	-.67+	-.52
	(.22)	(.23)	(.29)	(.34)	(.31)
Percent European	.14	.15	.13	.28**	.14
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.19)
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions	.13*	.13*	.11+	.10+	.09*
	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)	(.04)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923	3.92*	4.04*	3.36*	4.47**	4.77***
	(1.57)	(1.58)	(1.58)	(1.53)	(1.33)
Percent Evangelized by 1900	.19*	.18*	.20*	.21**	.24***
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)	(.06)
Years Exposure to Catholic Missions	.02	.02	.01	.04	
	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	
Foreign Catholic priests per 10,000 pop. in 1923	.88	.82	.82	.59	
	(.99)	(.99)	(.98)	(.94)	
Date 1st Sighted by Europeans after 1444		-.03	-.02	-.01	-.02
		(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)
Gap between Sighted & 1st Missionaries		-.00	-.02	.03	
		(.02)	(.03)	(.04)	
Interaction Mission Gap & Pre-Mission Literacy			-.05	.00	
			(.03)	(.04)	
Interaction of Missions Gap & Latitude			.003+	.000	
			(.001)	(.002)	
Gap between Sighted & Colonized				-.03	-.03
				(.03)	(.02)
Interaction of Colonial Gap & Pre-Mission Literacy				-.07+	-.07*
				(.04)	(.03)
Interaction of Colonial Gap & Latitude				.004**	.003**
				(.001)	(.001)
Number of Times Territory Switched Colonizers				-.25	
				(1.76)	
"Protestant" Colonizer Took Colony from "Catholics"				16.50**	15.08**
				(5.98)	(4.76)
N	142	142	142	142	142
# of Variables in Regression	18	20	22	27	14
Adjusted R-squared	.450	.443	.449	.472	.504

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space.
Coefficients and standard errors from robust regression (rreg in Stata), R-squared from OLS regression.

Table 3: OLS Regression Predicting Democracy in "Non-West": Mean Level of Democracy from 1950-1994								
Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**
	Full Sample	Reduced to AJR "Settler" Mortality Sample	"Settler" Mortality Sample	"Settler" Mortality Sample	Reduced to 1500 Population Density Sample	1500 Population Density Sample	Reduced to 1500 Urbanization Sample	Reduced to 1940s Life Expectancy Sample
Dutch Colony	-44.73**	-79.63***	-78.71***	-74.39***	-56.98***	-57.11***	--[a]	--
	(16.37)	(20.70)	(21.07)	(20.68)	(16.35)	(16.63)	--	--
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions	.15***	.26***	.26***	.24***	.21***	.21***	.20**	.26*
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(.05)	(.08)	(.12)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923	4.39***	4.19+	4.16+	4.13+	2.76	2.76	18.49***	-17.80
	(1.27)	(2.13)	(2.17)	(2.12)	(1.78)	(1.80)	(5.23)	(16.88)
Percent Evangelized by 1900	.28***	.18+	.19+	.18+	.31***	.31***	--[b]	.49*
	(.05)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.07)	(.07)	--	(.22)
"Settler" Mortality Rate (from AJR 2001)			.001					
			(.005)					
Natural Log of "Settler" Mortality Rate				-2.23				
				(2.20)				
Population Density in 1500						-.01		
						(.18)		
Urbanization in 1500							.47	
							(.71)	
Life Expectancy in 1940								.63
								(.55)
N	142	58	58	58	86	86	35	26
Adjusted R-squared	.452	.525	.516	.520	.539	.533	.418	.192

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space.
Coefficients & standard errors from robust regression (rreg in Stata), R^2 from OLS regression.
[a] "Dutch colony" dropped because one case (Indonesia) insufficient for robust regression.
[b] "Percent Evangelized by 1900" dropped because of collinearity.

Table 4: Mechanisms by which Protestant Missions may have Influenced Democracy (OLS)									
Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
	Model 3 from Table 1	Model 3 from Table 1	Model 3 from Table 1	Control for Religion	Reduced to GDP Sample	Control for Ln GDP [a]	Reduced to Educ. Sample	1st Secondary Education[b]	Mean Secondary Education[b]
Regressions also Control for Variables in Table 1, Model 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes[c]	Yes[c]	Yes[c]
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions	.13*			.13*	.10+	.12+	.16+	.18*	.19*
	(.05)			(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.08)	(.09)	(.09)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923	3.91*			3.67*	3.49*	4.05*	1.33	.76	.13
	(1.59)			(1.85)	(1.70)	(1.81)	(3.22)	(3.31)	(3.37)
Percent Evangelized by 1900	.18*			.17*	.31***	.27**	.23*	.28*	.27*
	(.08)			(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)
Years Exposure to Catholic Missions	.02			.02	.01	.02	.04	.03	.04
	(.02)			(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Foreign Catholic priests per 10,000 pop. in 1923	.88			.90	1.11	.98	.75	.51	.65
	(1.00)			(1.06)	(1.05)	(1.12)	(1.51)	(1.53)	(1.52)
Percent Protestant		.28+		-.02					
		(.15)		(.16)					
Percent Non-Religious			-3.29**	-1.19					
			(1.19)	(1.17)					
Natural Log of GDP per capita: Mean 1960-1994[a]						-.87			
						(1.89)			
Earliest Available Secondary Educ. Enrollment Rate[b]								.62	
								(.43)	
Mean Secondary Ed. Enrollment Rate: 1960-1985[b]									.59+
									(.35)
N	141[d]	141	141	141	112	112	84	84	84
# of Variables in Regression	18	14	14	20	18	20	17[c]	19	19
Adjusted R-squared	.445	.348	.358	.439	.425	.422	.441	.451	.462

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space

[a] Also controls for year GDP data first available. [b] Also controls for year education data first available. [c] Control for Dutch Colonialism dropped due to insufficient N for robust regression. [d] One influential case dropped by robust regressions that control for percent non-religious. I dropped this case from the initial regression to keep N consistent. This had no influence on the significance level of any coefficients.

Table 5: 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression with Robust VCE Predicting Democracy in "Nonwestern" Societies: Mean Level of Democracy from 1950-1994

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
British Colony	-8.16	.77	17.57***	17.26***	-12.56	-4.22
	(9.44)	(7.78)	(4.71)	(4.70)	(16.48)	(7.52)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	10.04	6.36	35.86**	36.87***	-15.12	11.62
	(12.55)	(14.84)	(11.39)	(11.20)	(29.78)	(12.02)
Dutch Colony	-89.13*	-44.02	6.00	5.91	-92.47	-73.13*
	(36.04)	(26.02)	(16.11)	(16.07)	(59.02)	(29.56)
Never Colonized Significantly	-1.05	-2.75	7.32	6.51	-7.73	-.19
	(8.05)	(9.16)	(8.09)	(7.97)	(14.65)	(7.81)
Latitude				.25	-1.13	-.19
				(.28)	(.95)	(.34)
Island Nation	6.43	8.82	4.93	5.37	11.06	8.87
	(6.32)	(6.87)	(6.40)	(6.41)	(9.94)	(5.86)
Landlocked Nation	7.21	-6.66	-7.59			
	(8.94)	(6.78)	(5.82)			
Percent European	.26**	.33**	-.01	.01	.47*	.25*
	(.10)	(.11)	(.13)	(.12)	(.21)	(.10)
Percent Muslim	.02	.04	.01	.02	.21	-.02
	(.10)	(.11)	(.09)	(.09)	(.22)	(.09)
Major Oil Producer	-2.05	1.29	-6.85	-6.27	8.10	-3.06
	(5.96)	(7.09)	(5.76)	(5.72)	(12.29)	(5.72)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	-4.30	.98	-2.54	-2.29	11.26	-5.79
	(5.72)	(7.34)	(5.84)	(5.76)	(14.23)	(5.39)
Mean Max. Temperature Hottest Month	-.44	-.84	-.21	-.41	-.71	-.21
	(.85)	(1.00)	(.82)	(.85)	(1.51)	(.85)
Mean Min. Temperature Coldest Month	.66	.66	-.52			
	(.49)	(.55)	(.47)			
Percent Freezes During Year	.19	.27	.03	.06	37.53	10.76
	(.15)	(.18)	(.15)	(.13)	(30.72)	(13.29)
Percent Mountains	-.03	-.04	-.14	-.16	-.81	-1.55
	(.14)	(.15)	(.14)	(.14)	(23.72)	(13.39)
Malaria Endemic	-.67	5.47	8.45	8.15	7.01	-.68
	(5.30)	(6.33)	(5.97)	(5.73)	(9.79)	(5.31)
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions (instrumented)	.39**					.33***
	(.14)					(.10)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923 (instrumented)		15.58*			30.70+	
		(6.12)			(16.05)	
Percent Evangelized by 1900 (instrumented)			.49**	.46**		
			(.17)	(.15)		
Excluded Instrument Used:	*Latitude*	*Latitude*	*Latitude*	*Min. Temp & Landlocked*	*Min. Temp & Landlocked*	*Min. Temp & Landlocked*
N	142	142	142	142	142	142
R-squared (second stage)	.395	.234	.414	.417		.425
R-squared (first stage)	.647	.484	.672	.647	.484	.672
F from first stage regression	18.53	9.69	26.72	17.83	1.66	15.83
P from Wooldridge OverID Test	-	-	-	.114	.591	.171

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space. Robust VCE. Regressions also control for "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only."

Online Appendix: Additional Regressions
"Weber through the Back Door: Protestant Competition, Elite Power Dispersion and the Global Spread of Democracy"

Table 6: Comparing Measures of Democracy: Polity 1950-2007 vs. Bollen & Paxton			
Measure of Democracy	Polity 1950-2007		Bollen & Paxton
British Colony		1.40	2.23
		(1.05)	(5.38)
Other Protestant Colony		9.48**	50.00**
		(3.14)	(16.11)
Dutch Colony		-10.59*	-37.50
		(5.25)	(26.97)
Never Colonized Significantly		-.25	-.06
		(1.32)	(6.79)
Latitude		-.04	-.18
		(.04)	(.21)
Island Nation		4.17***	5.07
		(1.10)	(5.67)
Landlocked Nation		1.03	2.77
		(1.05)	(5.41)
% European		.06**	.01
		(.02)	(.10)
% Muslim		.01	.06
		(.01)	(.07)
Major Oil Producer		-1.67	-4.47
		(1.04)	(5.36)
Literate Culture Prior to Missionary Contact		-.14	-2.65
		(.98)	(5.04)
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions	.024**	.03**	.12*
	(.008)	(.01)	(.05)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923	1.03*	-.15	.58
	(.46)	(.49)	(2.50)
% Evangelized by 1900	.07***	.06***	.34***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.07)
N	119[a]	119[a]	118[a]
R-squared	.367	.513	.455
Adjusted R-squared	.351	.448	.381

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space.
Coefficients & standard errors from robust regression (rreg in Stata), R^2 from OLS regression.
[a]Bollen & Paxton lacks data for one country in Polity. Results do not change if I limit the Polity sample to 118.

Table 7: Robust Regression Showing Relationship between Lange's Measures of British Direct Colonial Rule and Democracy[a]							
	Controlling for Court Cases			Controlling for Colonial Police			
VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Percent Cases Tried in Customary Courts	-0.57**	-0.24					
	(0.16)	(0.15)					
Colonial Police per 1,000 people				13.65*	2.19	2.28	
				(6.67)	(5.82)	(5.26)	
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions		0.42**	0.43**		0.48**	0.49**	0.48**
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923		5.91*	5.34+		5.67+	5.84*	5.73+
		(2.75)	(2.87)		(3.11)	(2.65)	(3.11)
% Evangelized by 1900		-0.047	0.084		0.016		0.045
		(0.20)	(0.19)		(0.22)		(0.20)
Constant	9.88	-154.02*	-176.88*	63.89	-182.8*	-183.8*	-197.3*
	(61.24)	(69.38)	(73.42)	(87.11)	(88.16)	(77.22)	(86.76)
Observations	34	34	34	32	32	32	32
R-squared	0.356	0.603	0.563	0.159	0.573	0.582	0.561

+ < .1, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; two-tailed test.

[a] Regressions also control "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only."

Table 8: Robust Regression Testing the Impact of Forced Settlement on Missionary Coefficients					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
British Colony	2.61	8.45+	0.11	-0.58	0.39
	(5.70)	(4.95)	(5.49)	(5.59)	(5.63)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	16.05	31.41*	21.08+	20.51+	-45.61*
	(11.60)	(12.31)	(11.32)	(11.42)	(21.36)
Dutch Colony	-35.30+	-3.28	-38.82+	-42.31*	23.10+
	(21.16)	(17.81)	(20.38)	(20.84)	(12.00)
Never Colonized Significantly	0.35	-0.32	-1.31	-1.82	-1.67
	(7.73)	(8.38)	(7.41)	(7.49)	(7.93)
Latitude	0.04	0.46*	-0.01	-0.01	0.17
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Island Nation	4.43	11.74**	2.57	3.81	10.07+
	(5.46)	(5.82)	(5.31)	(5.39)	(5.51)
Landlocked Nation	0.34	-10.53+	0.80	0.26	-2.80
	(5.98)	(5.90)	(5.74)	(5.78)	(6.15)
Percent European	0.14	0.26*	0.18+	0.20+	0.26*
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.104)
Percent Muslim	0.03	-0.12	0.05	0.04	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Major Oil Producer	-4.58	-6.55	-4.07	-3.99	-5.30
	(5.74)	(6.20)	(5.50)	(5.54)	(5.88)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	-4.63	-9.48*	-3.78	-4.17	-5.92
	(5.27)	(5.61)	(5.09)	(5.12)	(5.36)
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions	0.13*		0.11*	0.11*	0.15**
	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923	3.77*		3.95**	3.86**	
	(1.48)		(1.43)	(1.47)	
Percent Evangelized by 1900	0.23**		0.23**	0.20*	
	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)	
Forced Settlement Colony		24.08**	16.72*	-0.68	-15.62
		(7.62)	(7.14)	(17.38)	(18.14)
Yrs of Prot. Missions X Forced Settlement				0.11	0.22+
				(0.11)	(0.11)
Constant	1.688	32.87*	5.302	12.46	32.46+
	(19.51)	(19.84)	(18.84)	(19.82)	(19.32)
N	142	142	142	142	142
Adjusted R-squared	0.509	0.437	0.549	0.545	0.478

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test.
Regressions also control "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only."

Table 9: Consistency of the Association between Protestant Missions and Democracy across World Regions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Islands	Sub-Saharan Africa	Asia	Latin America & Caribbean	Latin America & Caribbean
British Colony	16.45+	-1.15	10.34	50.18**	11.17
	(9.00)	(7.01)	(7.91)	(17.27)	(41.93)
Percent European	-0.31	0.87	1.16*	0.05	0.04
	(0.20)	(0.84)	(0.52)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Percent Muslim	-0.31	0.10	0.02	-1.64	-1.01
	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(1.32)	(1.49)
OPEC Member	-47.28+	-2.21	-20.14*	7.18	5.58
	(24.51)	(17.61)	(9.82)	(17.28)	(17.55)
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions	0.18*	0.23**	0.12*	0.06	-0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Island Nation		8.21	8.19	-20.03*	-21.00*
		(8.50)	(9.78)	(8.95)	(9.08)
Landlocked Nation		2.86		-8.00	-10.35
		(6.61)		(13.41)	(13.79)
British Colony * Years Protestant Missions					0.26
					(0.26)
Constant	39.80	-92.86**	-13.78	74.27	88.78
	(38.85)	(35.31)	(32.80)	(64.08)	(66.54)
N	40	46	39	34	34
Adjusted R-squared	0.546	0.478	0.520	0.602	0.614

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test.
Regressions also control "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only."

Table 10: Regression Controlling for Additional Environmental Conditions that May Have Influenced the Spread of Missionaries				
	Model 3, Table 1	Control for Additional Environmental Conditions		
Regressions also Control All Variables in Table 1, Model 3	**Yes**	**Yes**	No, only Dutch Colony, Latitude, Island, & Landlocked[a]	No, only Dutch Colony[a]
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions	.13*	.15**	.17***	.15***
	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)	(.04)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923	3.91*	3.02+	3.72*	4.39***
	(1.59)	(1.72)	(1.56)	(1.28)
% Evangelized by 1900	.18*	.15	.18*	.28***
	(.08)	(.09)	(.08)	(.05)
Years Exposure to Catholic Missions	.02	.01	.01	
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	
Foreign Catholic priests per 10,000 pop. in 1923	.89	.92	.87	
	(1.00)	(1.06)	(1.03)	
Mean High Temperature in Hottest Month (Celsius)		-.62	-.57	
		(1.17)	(1.05)	
Mean Low Temperature in Coldest Month (Celsius)		.70	.22	
		(1.08)	(1.00)	
Percent of Country Freezes in Winter		.12	.08	
		(.17)	(.16)	
Percent of Country Wetlands		-.07	-.04	
		(.33)	(.31)	
Percent of Country Mountains		.08	.00	
		(.18)	(.16)	
Percent of Country River Access		-.12	-.08	
		(.09)	(.08)	
Mean Distance to the Coast in Km		.01	.00	
		(.01)	(.01)	
Mean Annual Precipitation in Centimeters		-.02	.02	
		(.03)	(.03)	
Mean Elevation		-.37	-.33	
		(.31)	(.28)	
Interaction of High Temperature & Precipitation		-.00	-.00	
		(.00)	(.00)	
Malaria Endemic		4.81	3.87	
		(6.07)	(5.73)	
N	141	141	141	141
# of Variables in Regression	18	29	22	6
Adjusted R-squared	.445	.446	.440	.447

+ < .1, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table.

Coefficients and standard errors from robust regression (rreg in Stata), R-squared from OLS regression.

[a]Regressions also control "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only."

Table 11: 2SLS Instrumental Variable Regression with Robust VCE Predicting Mean Level of Democracy from 1950-1994 in "Nonwestern" Societies:						
Model	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**
British Colony	-3.05	-1.16	17.88**	17.29**	3.67	-3.46
	(6.00)	(6.85)	(4.43)	(4.26)	(6.11)	(7.55)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	13.24	4.52	38.10**	35.02**	9.84	12.71
	(9.54)	(15.88)	(12.00)	(11.33)	(12.40)	(10.01)
Dutch Colony	-68.96**	-50.49+	6.16	3.79	-32.16	-68.14*
	(25.06)	(26.71)	(5.07)	(4.39)	(20.96)	(33.01)
Never Colonized Significantly	-0.25	-3.72	7.63	6.05	-1.28	0.06
	(7.51)	(7.67)	(8.62)	(7.61)	(7.32)	(7.54)
Latitude						
Island Nation	7.18	9.39	5.17	4.38	11.60+	9.68
	(6.48)	(6.76)	(6.77)	(6.43)	(5.94)	(6.11)
Landlocked Nation				-7.08	-9.51	1.54
				(5.00)	(5.79)	(7.35)
Percent European	0.25+	0.35**	-0.03	0.05	0.29**	0.24+
	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Percent Muslim	-0.021	0.07	0.042	0.00	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Major Oil Producer	-2.98	2.56	-6.61+	-6.24	-0.62	-3.26
	(5.19)	(5.93)	(3.91)	(4.02)	(5.74)	(5.35)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	-5.64	2.87	-1.04	-2.95	-1.94	-6.12
	(5.16)	(6.73)	(5.75)	(5.44)	(6.14)	(5.34)
Mean Max. Temperature Hottest Month	-0.33	-0.96	-0.25	-0.15	-0.69	-0.37
	(0.74)	(0.93)	(0.72)	(0.72)	(0.86)	(0.76)
Mean Min. Temperature Coldest Month	0.47	0.85+	-0.47			
	(0.45)	(0.50)	(0.48)			
Percent Freezes During Year	18.30	29.42+	1.84	16.15	11.37	4.81
	(17.02)	(15.50)	(16.61)	(10.37)	(10.19)	(11.67)
Percent Mountains	-2.08	-5.48	-17.02	-11.04	-4.23	-3.58
	(15.17)	(16.40)	(13.67)	(13.66)	(14.86)	(15.07)
Malaria Endemic	-0.36	5.84	9.16	6.66	4.92	0.05
	(5.33)	(7.59)	(6.53)	(6.13)	(6.26)	(5.19)
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions (instrumented)	0.31**					0.31**
	(0.07)					(0.12)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923 (instrumented)		17.66**			12.36*	
		(5.85)			(5.40)	
Percent Evangelized by 1900 (instrumented)			0.56**	0.42**		
			(0.15)	(0.14)		
Excluded Instrument Used:	*Latitude & Landlock*	*Latitude & Landlock*	*Latitude & Landlock*	*Latitude & Min Temp*	*Latitude & Min Temp*	*Latitude & Min Temp*
N	142	142	142	142	142	142
R-squared (second stage)	.438	.137	.381	.432	.339	.431
R-squared (first stage)	.647	.484	.672	.672	.484	.647
F from first stage regression	36.74	4.98	14.07	18.42	4.22	13.81
P from Wooldridge OverID Test	.350	.273	.155	.286	.182	.166

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space. Robust VCE. Regressions also control "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only."

Table 12: First-Stage Regressions for Table 11						
Model	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**
	Yrs Prot Miss	# Prot Miss. in 1923	Evang. % 1900	Evang. % 1900	# Prot Miss. in 1923	Yrs Prot Miss
British Colony	57.73***	.88***	-6.31	-6.31	.88***	57.73***
	(8.47)	(.26)	(4.62)	(4.62)	(.26)	(8.47)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	49.31***	1.47*	-13.16	-13.16	1.47*	49.31***
	(11.41)	(.74)	(9.51)	(9.51)	(.74)	(11.41)
Dutch Colony	242.51***	3.20*	-.34	-.34	3.20*	242.51***
	(46.68)	(1.43)	(11.72)	(11.72)	(1.43)	(46.68)
Never Colonized Significantly	8.16	.31	-10.47	-10.47	.31	8.16
	(16.31)	(.24)	(9.72)	(9.72)	(.24)	(16.31)
Latitude	3.31***	.08**	2.62***	2.62***	.08**	3.31***
	(.67)	(.03)	(.52)	(.52)	(.03)	(.67)
Island Nation	-.46	-.16	2.66	2.66	-.16	-.46
	(11.35)	(.38)	(7.84)	(7.84)	(.38)	(11.35)
Landlocked Nation	-43.36***	-.20	-4.41	-4.41	-.20	-43.36***
	(8.18)	(.19)	(6.68)	(6.68)	(.19)	(8.18)
Percent European	-.18	-.01*	.39**	.39**	-.01*	-.18
	(.17)	(.00)	(.12)	(.12)	(.00)	(.17)
Percent Muslim	-.35*	-.01***	-.27**	-.27**	-.01***	-.35*
	(.16)	(.00)	(.10)	(.10)	(.00)	(.16)
Major Oil Producer	-8.72	-.43+	2.81	2.81	-.43+	-8.72
	(11.45)	(.23)	(6.01)	(6.01)	(.23)	(11.45)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	-12.58	-.66**	-13.52+	-13.52+	-.66**	-12.58
	(9.53)	(.23)	(6.98)	(6.98)	(.23)	(9.53)
Mean Max. Temperature Hottest Month	-1.63	-.02	-1.75*	-1.75*	-.02	-1.63
	(1.81)	(.05)	(.86)	(.86)	(.05)	(1.81)
Mean Min. Temperature Coldest Month	2.46*	.06*	4.33***	4.33***	.06*	2.46*
	(1.03)	(.03)	(.72)	(.72)	(.03)	(1.03)
Percent Freezes During Year	.47	-.52	32.84+	32.84+	-.52	.47
	(25.94)	(.61)	(18.09)	(18.09)	(.61)	(25.94)
Percent Mountains	-13.81	-.29	11.05	11.05	-.29	-13.81
	(23.68)	(.80)	(15.12)	(15.12)	(.80)	(23.68)
Malaria Endemic	11.92	-.09	-9.00	-9.00	-.09	11.92
	(9.48)	(.44)	(6.46)	(6.46)	(.44)	(9.48)
Excluded Instrument Used:	*Latitude & Landlock*	*Latitude & Landlock*	*Latitude & Landlock*	*Latitude & Min Temp*	*Latitude & Min Temp*	*Latitude & Min Temp*
N	142	142	142	142	142	142
R-squared (first stage)	.647	.484	.672	.672	.484	.647
F from first stage regression	36.74	4.98	14.07	18.42	4.22	13.81
P from OverID Test	.350	.273	.155	2.86	1.82	.166

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space.
Regressions also control "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only."

Table 13: Consistency of Protestant Mission Coefficients Regardless of Instrument Used (IVReg 2SLS)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions (instrumented)	0.39***	0.23*	0.26*	0.24*	
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923 (instrumented)					12.81**
					(4.36)
British Colony	-7.84	1.44	-0.11	1.01	3.18
	(7.43)	(7.76)	(7.74)	(8.00)	(5.61)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	10.12	18.23	16.07	17.46+	10.47
	(10.69)	(10.36)	(10.17)	(10.50)	(13.52)
Dutch Colony	-87.95*	-48.82	-54.92+	-51.02+	-35.25+
	(34.94)	(30.22)	(30.14)	(31.)	(18.04)
Never Colonized Significantly	-1.14	0.30	-0.08	0.043	-2.04
	(8.10)	(6.85)	(6.98)	(6.71)	(6.91)
Latitude		0.55	0.31	0.47	0.23
		(0.57)	(0.50)	(0.56)	(0.63)
Island Nation	6.31	6.35	7.02	6.25	8.35
	(6.78)	(6.44)	(6.53)	(6.48)	(6.13)
Landlocked Nation	6.97				-7.21
	(7.55)				(5.21)
Percent European	0.26+	0.22+	0.24+	0.23+	0.30**
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Percent Muslim	0.01	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04	0.16
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(5.33)
Major Oil Producer	-1.98	-3.50	-3.68	-3.27	-0.86
	(5.57)	(4.93)	(4.96)	(5.50)	(0.96)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	-4.81	-6.40	-7.08	-7.00	0.83
	(4.79)	(5.27)	(5.27)	(5.07)	(0.85)
Mean Max. Temperature Hottest Month	-0.32	-0.71		-0.48	25.98+
	(0.56)	(0.83)		(0.58)	(13.98)
Mean Min. Temperature Coldest Month	0.66	1.07	0.81	0.99	-5.35
	(0.48)	(0.72)	(0.69)	(0.75)	(15.80)
Percent Freezes During Year	19.26	19.21	22.20	19.32	5.27
	(18.00)	(16.14)	(15.84)	(16.52)	(5.99)
Percent Mountains		-5.56	0.72		12.81**
		(15.08)	(11.35)		(4.36)
Malaria Endemic	-0.95	1.31	0.10	0.61	3.18
	(5.49)	(5.37)	(5.11)	(5.21)	(5.61)
Excluded Instrument	% Mountains & Latitude	Landlocked	Landlocked & Avg. Max. Temp.	Landlocked & % Mountain	% Muslim & No Written Language
N	142	142	142	142	142
R^2 (2^{nd} Stage)	0.397	0.465	0.456	0.462	.333
R^2 (1^{st} Stage)	.647	.647	.647	.647	.484
F (1^{st} Stage)	12.54	28.13	17.77	14.48	11.69
P from over-ID test	.840	-	.402	.717	.860

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space.
Regressions also control "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only."

Table 14: First-Stage Regressions for Table 13					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	Yrs Prot Miss	Yrs Prot Miss	Yrs Prot Miss	Yrs Prot Miss	# Prot. Miss. in 1923
British Colony	57.73***	57.73***	57.73***	57.73***	.88***
	(8.47)	(8.47)	(8.47)	(8.47)	(.26)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	49.31***	49.31***	49.31***	49.31***	1.47*
	(11.41)	(11.41)	(11.41)	(11.41)	(.74)
Dutch Colony	242.51***	242.51***	242.51***	242.51***	3.20*
	(46.68)	(46.68)	(46.68)	(46.68)	(1.43)
Never Colonized Significantly	8.16	8.16	8.16	8.16	.31
	(16.31)	(16.31)	(16.31)	(16.31)	(.24)
Latitude	3.31***	3.31***	3.31***	3.31***	.08**
	(.67)	(.67)	(.67)	(.67)	(.03)
Island Nation	-.46	-.46	-.46	-.46	-.16
	(11.35)	(11.35)	(11.35)	(11.35)	(.38)
Landlocked Nation	-43.36***	-43.36***	-43.36***	-43.36***	-.20
	(8.18)	(8.18)	(8.18)	(8.18)	(.19)
Percent European	-.18	-.18	-.18	-.18	-.01*
	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.00)
Percent Muslim	-.35*	-.35*	-.35*	-.35*	-.01***
	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.00)
Major Oil Producer	-8.72	-8.72	-8.72	-8.72	-.43+
	(11.45)	(11.45)	(11.45)	(11.45)	(.23)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	-12.58	-12.58	-12.58	-12.58	-.66**
	(9.53)	(9.53)	(9.53)	(9.53)	(.23)
Mean Max. Temperature Hottest Month	-1.63	-1.63	-1.63	-1.63	-.02
	(1.81)	(1.81)	(1.81)	(1.81)	(.05)
Mean Min. Temperature Coldest Month	2.46*	2.46*	2.46*	2.46*	.06*
	(1.03)	(1.03)	(1.03)	(1.03)	(.03)
Percent Freezes During Year	.47	.47	.47	.47	-.52
	(25.94)	(25.94)	(25.94)	(25.94)	(.61)
Percent Mountains	-13.81	-13.81	-13.81	-13.81	-.29
	(23.68)	(23.68)	(23.68)	(23.68)	(.80)
Malaria Endemic	11.92	11.92	11.92	11.92	-.09
	(9.48)	(9.48)	(9.48)	(9.48)	(.44)
Excluded Instrument	% Mountains & Latitude	Landlocked	Landlocked & Avg. Max. Temp.	Landlocked & % Mountain	% Muslim & No Written Language
N	142	142	142	142	142
R^2 (1st Stage)	.647	.647	.647	.647	.484
F (1st Stage)	12.54	28.13	17.77	14.48	11.69
P from over-ID test	*.840*	-	.402	.717	.860

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space.
Regressions also control "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only."

Table 15: First-Stage Regressions for Table 5						
Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
	Yrs Prot Miss	# Prot Miss. in 1923	Evang. % 1900	Evang. % 1900	# Prot Miss. in 1923	Yrs Prot Miss
British Colony	57.73***	.88***	-6.31	-6.31	.88***	57.73***
	(8.47)	(.26)	(4.62)	(4.62)	(.26)	(8.47)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	49.31***	1.47*	-13.16	-13.16	1.47*	49.31***
	(11.41)	(.74)	(9.51)	(9.51)	(.74)	(11.41)
Dutch Colony	242.51***	3.20*	-.34	-.34	3.20*	242.51***
	(46.68)	(1.43)	(11.72)	(11.72)	(1.43)	(46.68)
Never Colonized Significantly	8.16	.31	-10.47	-10.47	.31	8.16
	(16.31)	(.24)	(9.72)	(9.72)	(.24)	(16.31)
Latitude	3.31***	.08**	2.62***	2.62***	.08**	3.31***
	(.67)	(.03)	(.52)	(.52)	(.03)	(.67)
Island Nation	-.46	-.16	2.66	2.66	-.16	-.46
	(11.35)	(.38)	(7.84)	(7.84)	(.38)	(11.35)
Landlocked Nation	-43.36***	-.20	-4.41	-4.41	-.20	-43.36***
	(8.18)	(.19)	(6.68)	(6.68)	(.19)	(8.18)
Percent European	-.18	-.01*	.39**	.39**	-.01*	-.18
	(.17)	(.00)	(.12)	(.12)	(.00)	(.17)
Percent Muslim	-.35*	-.01***	-.27**	-.27**	-.01***	-.35*
	(.16)	(.00)	(.10)	(.10)	(.00)	(.16)
Major Oil Producer	-8.72	-.43+	2.81	2.81	-.43+	-8.72
	(11.45)	(.23)	(6.01)	(6.01)	(.23)	(11.45)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	-12.58	-.66**	-13.52+	-13.52+	-.66**	-12.58
	(9.53)	(.23)	(6.98)	(6.98)	(.23)	(9.53)
Mean Max. Temperature Hottest Month	-1.63	-.02	-1.75*	-1.75*	-.02	-1.63
	(1.81)	(.05)	(.86)	(.86)	(.05)	(1.81)
Mean Min. Temperature Coldest Month	2.46*	.06*	4.33***	4.33***	.06*	2.46*
	(1.03)	(.03)	(.72)	(.72)	(.03)	(1.03)
Percent Freezes During Year	.47	-.52	32.84+	32.84+	-.52	.47
	(25.94)	(.61)	(18.09)	(18.09)	(.61)	(25.94)
Percent Mountains	-13.81	-.29	11.05	11.05	-.29	-13.81
	(23.68)	(.80)	(15.12)	(15.12)	(.80)	(23.68)
Malaria Endemic	11.92	-.09	-9.00	-9.00	-.09	11.92
	(9.48)	(.44)	(6.46)	(6.46)	(.44)	(9.48)
Excluded Instrument Used:	*Latitude*	*Latitude*	*Latitude*	*Min. Temp & Landlocked*	*Min. Temp & Landlocked*	*Min. Temp & Landlocked*
N	142	142	142	142	142	142
R-squared	.647	.484	.672	.672	.484	.647
F	24.17	8.05	25.51	21.02	3.65	25.41
P from OverID Test	-	-	-	.114	.591	.171

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test. Constant not shown in table to save space. Robust VCE.
Regressions also control "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only."

Table 16: Robust Regression Testing the Association between Protestant Missions and Democracy Controlling for Region	
British Colony	-4.26
	(5.16)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	11.93
	(10.51)
Dutch Colony	-60.12**
	(18.70)
Never Colonized Significantly	-8.67
	(7.15)
Latitude	-0.10
	(0.21)
Island Nation	5.23
	(5.06)
Landlocked Nation	-2.89
	(5.50)
Percent European	0.19+
	(0.10)
Percent Muslim	0.12+
	(0.07)
Major Oil Producer	-3.90
	(5.36)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	-11.97*
	(5.27)
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions	0.15**
	(0.05)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923	3.39*
	(1.36)
Caribbean Nation	14.76*
	(6.75)
Middle Eastern & North African Nation	-22.04**
	(7.15)
Sub-Saharan African Nation	-21.01***
	(4.91)
Constant	43.93*
	(17.09)
N	137
R-squared	0.623

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test.
Regressions also control "Year of 1st Democracy Data" & "Post-1976 Democracy Data Only."

Table 17: Robust Regressions Testing Whether Dropping Particular Types of Countries Influences the Protestant Missionary Coefficients.				
VARIABLES	Drop Countries with Large Eastern Christian Populations	Drop Countries with Large Eastern Christian Populations plus Sri Lanka	Drop Countries Colonized by the Ottomans	Drop Caribbean Islands and Majority Muslim Countries
British Colony	1.55	0.87	4.27	5.47
	(5.84)	(5.75)	(6.66)	(7.46)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	13.14	12.97	15.80	24.55*
	(11.12)	(10.92)	(11.79)	(11.40)
Dutch Colony	-38.05+	-36.06+	-38.75+	-
	(21.13)	(20.79)	(22.47)	-
Never Colonized Significantly	1.76	1.63	-3.35	1.42
	(8.57)	(8.43)	(8.58)	(9.13)
Latitude	-0.042	-0.028	0.083	0.09
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Island Nation	5.29	3.31	3.53	1.00
	(5.31)	(5.30)	(5.58)	(6.80)
Landlocked Nation	3.25	3.20	0.15	-8.03
	(5.97)	(5.87)	(6.33)	(6.75)
Percent European	0.34**	0.33**	0.22	0.17
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Percent Muslim	0.042	0.063	0.03	-0.04
	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.08)	(0.18)
Major Oil Producer	-5.37	-5.35	-0.46	7.81
	(5.84)	(5.74)	(6.71)	(9.27)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	-1.07	-2.95	-2.05	-10.64*
	(5.30)	(5.32)	(5.42)	(5.27)
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions	0.15*	0.14*	0.14*	-0.10
	(0.057)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923	3.74*	3.89**	3.31*	6.99**
	(1.44)	(1.41)	(1.54)	(1.76)
Percent Evangelized by 1900	0.26**	0.28**	0.23**	0.26**
	(0.072)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	-21.46	-22.65	-4.83	30.21
	(20.42)	(20.07)	(22.22)	(22.91)
Observations	130	129	124	85
R-squared	0.567	0.577	0.510	0.554

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test.

Table 18: Robust Regression Testing if Controlling for the Ottoman Empire Influences the Relationship between Protestant Missions and Democracy	
British Colony	3.23
	(5.44)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	16.91
	(11.06)
Dutch Colony	-36.13+
	(20.25)
Never Colonized Significantly	-0.82
	(7.37)
Latitude	0.15
	(0.22)
Island Nation	2.59
	(5.23)
Landlocked Nation	-2.49
	(5.78)
Percent European	0.10
	(0.10)
Percent Muslim	0.073
	(0.075)
Major Oil Producer	-2.35
	(5.52)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	-3.77
	(5.06)
Years Exposure to Protestant Missions	0.13*
	(0.05)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923	3.69*
	(1.42)
Percent Evangelized by 1900	0.26***
	(0.07)
Was in Ottoman Empire	-15.23*
	(6.67)
Constant	2.221
	(18.61)
N	142
R-squared	0.537

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test.

Table 19: Robust Regression Predicting Locations of Protestant and Catholic Missionaries in the Electoral Districts of India			
VARIABLES	*Protestant* Missionaries per 10K pop. *in 1903*	*Protestant* Missionaries per 10K pop. *in 1923*	*Catholic* Mission Stations per 10K pop. in 1906
Peasant land-ownership vs. Landlord system	0.001	0.04	0.0006
	(0.018)	(0.03)	(0.002)
Annual Rainfall	-0.000	-0.00006***	-0.000003*
	(0.000)	(0.00002)	(0.000001)
Maximum Temperature	-0.000	0.002	0.0001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0002)
Minimum Temperature	0.001	0.002	0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0001)
Coastal District	0.05*	0.10**	0.01***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.002)
Population Density	-0.00007*	-0.0001*	-0.000006
	(0.00003)	(0.00005)	(0.000003)
Percent Scheduled Caste	-0.02	-0.19	0.002
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.01)
Percent Scheduled Tribe	-0.01	0.09	-0.004
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.005)
British Rule	0.0002	-0.0001	0.00003
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.00003)
Percent Muslim	-0.06	-0.06	-0.003
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.006)
Constant	0.06	0.17	0.001
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.009)
Observations	232	233	233
R-squared	0.107	0.230	0.211

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test.

Table 20: Robust Regressions Showing What Predicts the Distribution of Protestant and Catholic Missionaries					
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Years of Catholic Missions	Years of Protestant Missions	Catholic Missionaries per 10,000 pop in 1923	Protestant. Missionaries per 10,000 pop in 1923	Percent Evangelized by 1900
British Colony	-63.88*	49.83***	-0.42**	0.20**	-8.25
	(25.58)	(8.539)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(5.43)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	-92.86	238.73***	0.52	0.08	7.33
	(91.26)	(30.47)	(0.51)	(0.26)	(19.37)
Dutch Colony	-189.60**	29.21	0.86*	3.86***	-17.09
	(60.71)	(20.27)	(0.34)	(0.17)	(12.88)
Never Colonized Significantly	-42.61	23.17	-0.27	0.001	-3.71
	(42.99)	(14.35)	(0.24)	(0.12)	(9.12)
Latitude	2.29	2.48**	0.025+	0.004	2.64***
	(2.40)	(0.80)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.51)
Island Nation	24.09	-22.49+	-0.45*	0.03	-0.88
	(35.42)	(11.83)	(0.20)	(0.10)	(7.52)
Landlocked Nation	-176.88***	-51.40***	-0.31*	-0.15+	-11.57+
	(30.70)	(10.25)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(6.52)
Percent European	1.74**	-0.27	0.01**	-0.001	0.45***
	(0.57)	(0.19)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.12)
Percent Muslim	-1.04*	-0.47**	-0.002	-0.003*	-0.32***
	(0.46)	(0.15)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.098)
Major Oil Producer	-21.89	-7.81	0.18	0.017	-1.00
	(32.16)	(10.74)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(6.83)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	30.42	-15.09	-0.36*	-0.16+	-14.08*
	(30.60)	(10.22)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(6.49)
Mean Max. Temperature Hottest Month	-7.21	-0.39	-0.03	0.005	-1.81
	(5.25)	(1.75)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(1.11)
Mean Min. Temperature Coldest Month	-0.21	1.83	0.04+	0.005	4.49***
	(4.00)	(1.34)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.85)
Percent Freezes During Year	-131.75	-13.27	-0.13	0.08	27.55
	(81.66)	(27.27)	(0.46)	(0.23)	(17.33)
Percent Mountains	29.63	-6.39	0.39	0.11	17.16
	(76.40)	(25.51)	(0.43)	(0.22)	(16.21)
Malaria Endemic	102.68***	-2.18	-0.02	-0.13	-10.75*
	(30.41)	(10.15)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(6.45)
Annual Precipitation	-0.002	-0.008	0.0001	-0.00004	-0.006
	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.0001)	(0.00006)	(0.005)
Constant	408.91*	72.74	0.91	0.26	24.63
	(165.57)	(55.28)	(0.93)	(0.47)	(35.14)
N	143	143	143	143	143
R-squared	0.508	0.585	0.439	0.849	0.653

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test.

Table 21: Robust Regression Showing the Association between Protestant Missions and Daily Newspaper Circulation per 1,000 Inhabitants						
Year:	1975		1980	1985	1990	1995
British Colony	6.80	-0.92	-1.00	-4.54	-3.31	-0.66
	(6.16)	(6.57)	(6.50)	(7.21)	(6.83)	(6.52)
Other Religious Liberty Colony	-24.09	-46.63*	-51.10**	-58.70**	-41.33	-42.62*
	(16.98)	(18.11)	(17.93)	(20.17)	(30.20)	(18.29)
Dutch Colony	39.65+	8.95	21.02	23.52	11.97	23.01
	(20.54)	(21.83)	(21.61)	(24.22)	(22.94)	(22.00)
Never Colonized Significantly	5.61	5.16	5.12	2.79	6.39	13.69
	(10.51)	(10.42)	(10.29)	(11.14)	(10.40)	(10.27)
Latitude	1.01***	0.77**	0.89**	0.90**	0.90**	0.68*
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Island Nation	4.67	6.50	5.63	6.18	13.25+	12.87+
	(7.23)	(7.19)	(7.11)	(8.04)	(7.85)	(7.31)
Landlocked Nation	-18.46*	-15.11*	-16.31*	-17.57*	-18.09*	-21.31**
	(7.57)	(7.55)	(7.45)	(8.29)	(7.38)	(6.77)
Percent European	0.59***	0.68***	0.81***	0.79***	0.69***	0.59***
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Percent Muslim	-0.33**	-0.24*	-0.18+	-0.18*	-0.16	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Major Oil Producer	6.26	5.56	1.18	3.51	11.87	11.35
	(8.15)	(8.11)	(8.03)	(8.85)	(7.90)	(7.42)
Literate Culture before Missionary Contact	1.27	6.86	2.87	4.05	-0.47	-3.89
	(7.05)	(7.20)	(7.02)	(7.75)	(7.36)	(7.05)
Protestant Missionaries per 10,000 pop. in 1923		10.02***	11.70***	12.73***	9.03***	8.43***
		(2.45)	(2.42)	(2.71)	(2.62)	(2.50)
Constant	16.14*	9.50	9.60	11.21	11.99+	12.62*
	(6.48)	(6.52)	(6.39)	(7.19)	(6.67)	(6.22)
Observations	108	108	109	111	113	118
R-squared	0.464	0.537	0.602	0.553	0.517	0.483

+ ≤ .1, * ≤ .05, ** ≤ .01, *** ≤ .001; two-tailed test.
Source for Dependent Variable: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, http://www.uis.unesco.org/ev_en.php?ID=3754_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC